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SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
REBECCA HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF*
ABSTRACT
Social value orientation is a psychological trait defined as an
individual’s natural preference with respect to the allocation of
resources. Law and economics scholarship takes as its starting point
the rational actor, who is by definition interested solely in maximiz-
ing her own personal utility. But social psychology research demon-
strates that, in study after study, approximately half of individuals
demonstrate a “prosocial” orientation, meaning that they are
interested in maximizing the total outcome of the group and are
dedicated to an equal split of resources. Only around a quarter of
individuals identify as “proself” individualists who prefer to maxi-
mize their own outcome per the rational actor model, and members
of yet another, smaller group identify as “proself” competitors who
want to maximize the relative difference between their own and
others’ outcomes. This Article presents social psychologists’ findings
regarding the nature of social value orientation and the role that it
plays in guiding behavior. It then assesses legal theory and doctrine
through the lens of social value orientation in several discrete sub-
stantive areas—contract law, corporate law, and family law—as well
as in legal procedure and process, showing that “proself” and
“prosocial” categories offer a meaningful and helpful way of under-
standing current doctrine and its effects on behavior. A consideration
of social value orientation provides an important, empirical counter-
balance to the rationality assumptions of law and economics, helping
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Appleton, Matt Bodie, Debbie Dinner, Pauline Kim, Laura Rosenbury, Steven Shavell,
members of the Law & Economics Seminar at Harvard Law School, and participants in law
faculty workshops at Florida State University, the University of Connecticut, and Washington
University for helpful comments and suggestions.
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to show that personal utility maximization neither consistently
guides the development of legal doctrine nor dictates human behavior
in response to the law. In addition, taking social value orientation
seriously suggests insights for the very nature of the relationship
between law and human behavior, implicating “nudges,” the
potential “crowding out” effect of laws that invoke extrinsic motiva-
tion, and the ultimate character of human utility.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary legal analysis often relies on the rational actor
model—presuming an individual whose goal is to maximize utility—
to understand how law is and should be crafted, and how individu-
als will respond to benefits and liabilities set forth by the legal
system.1 However, over the past two decades, the rational actor
paradigm has increasingly faced challenges from psychological
research on cognitive biases and heuristics.2 The heuristics and
biases research shows that individuals systematically fail to behave
like rational actors in judgment and decision-making because of
consistent errors in processing information.3 In particular, research
on the cognitive distortions that occur because of the human pro-
pensity to evaluate different options as deviations from a current
frame of reference—prospect theory—has achieved a significant
degree of prominence.4 Although this research poses a challenge to
the predictions of the rational actor model, at its heart, it does not
truly threaten the model, because it suggests that deviations in real
behavior from predictions of the rational actor model are explicable
as systematic human error.5 People want to maximize their utility—
they just make predictable mistakes along the way.6
1. See generally Claire Finkelstein, Legal Theory and the Rational Actor, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF RATIONALITY 399, 399-401 (Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling eds., 2004).
2. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1477-78, 1504, 1545 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-99 (1991);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341,
346, 348 (1984). 
4. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Science for his work on prospect theory. See Daniel Altman, A Nobel That Bridges Economics
and Psychology, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10/business/a-
nobel-that-bridges-economics-and-psychology.html [https://perma.cc/65AZ-QMV7].
5. Indeed, some scholars even suggest that these biases may be at once distorting and
rational. For example, CEOs are overconfident, but this overconfidence propels them to the
head of companies. See Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection,
and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FINANCE 2737, 2739-40 (2008); Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATE LAW 442, 444 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
6. See, e.g., Goel & Thakor, supra note 5, at 2739-40.
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However, other strands of research in psychology simultaneously
challenge the assumption of the rational utility-maximizer from a
host of different angles.7 Research on the psychology of justice, for
example, suggests that individuals may be motivated by concerns
that are not fully represented by traditional economic conceptions
of utility.8 These noninstrumental concerns9 include a desire for
dignity, respect, fair treatment, and legitimacy.10 Similarly, as
another example, research on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
challenges the primacy of economic incentives and sanctions.11 And
research on temporal construal suggests that the conceptualization
of events in the near and long term can differ significantly and in
ways that make a difference for decision-making.12
From a variety of perspectives, psychological research makes
clear that sanctions and incentives—sticks and carrots—are not,
alone, responsible for individuals’ behavior. Nor are they in an
obvious way the only guiding star for the design of the legal system.
Values play a critical role in influencing actions and in shaping the
structure and content of the law.13 Values may refer to moral,
7. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social
Behavior?, 311 SCIENCE 47 (2006). 
8. Robust research in the field of procedural justice, across a wide variety of domains,
finds that individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by which a decision is
made, regardless of the fairness or favorability of the decision itself. For a review, see Robert
J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness,
1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 171-72 (2005). For further examples of settings in which
procedural justice plays an important role, see infra note 99.
9. Tom Tyler and David De Cremer explain the distinction between instrumental and
noninstrumental motivations as follows: “Instrumental motivations reflect people’s desire to
gain material resources and avoid material losses. Social motives, as discussed by
psychologists, differ in that they are motivations that flow from within the person, leading to
self-regulatory behaviors.” Tom R. Tyler & David De Cremer, Cooperation in Groups, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 155, 157 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2006). 
10. See MacCoun, supra note 8, at 171-72.
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations:
Comment on Feldman, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2011).
12. See Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of Temporal Distance on Level of Mental
Construal, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 523-24 (2002) (finding that people
typically construe events in the distant future at a “higher level,” broadly and abstractly, but
construe events in the near term more specifically, thinking about the concrete features of the
event). 
13. For a normative critique of the rational actor paradigm, see LYNN A. STOUT,
CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011); see also Camerer &
Fehr, supra note 7, at 52.
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ideological, philosophical, or religious beliefs, and they may also
reflect internalized social norms.14 However defined, values typically
encompass principles that may be orthogonal or even oppositional
to pure economic utility,15 a point certainly made by critics of law
and economics,16 although Ronald Dworkin notably argued that the
embrace of economic utility provides its own moral approach.17
Looking at human values is another way to understand how law
has been and should be crafted, and how individuals may respond
14. See, e.g., Yehezkel Dror, Values and the Law, 17 ANTIOCH REV. 440, 440 (1957) (“By
its very nature, law consists of a number of norms which constitute obligatory rules of
behavior for the members of the society. These legal norms are closely related to various social
values, being either a direct expression of them or serving them in a more indirect way.”).
15. Of course, some law and economics scholars explicitly encourage the inclusion of
noneconomic values in their conception of utility. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). This adds considerable
complexity to the rational actor model, because utility is defined broadly to encompass
nonmonetary or resource-based considerations that may differ from person to person. See id.
at 979-80. While that model of utility would suggest that social value orientation (SVO) itself
could be subsumed within any one person’s conception of utility—for example, a prosocial
person, as defined infra, text accompanying note 22, derives utility from acting in a way that
shares monetary value equally, rather than gaining more money than another person—that
variegated and nuanced model of utility is not the model that is most often used in the
application of economic theory to legal paradigms. In particular, much of the very influential
work of Richard Posner eliminated or limited serious consideration of nonmonetary or
resource-based utility in academic and doctrinal analyses. See infra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text. Additionally, though, the SVO measurement tool uses “points,” rather
than money, allowing individuals within the paradigm to provide their own definition of
utility for each point. Paul A.M. Van Lange et al., Development of Prosocial, Individualistic,
and Competitive Orientations: Theory and Preliminary Evidence, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 733, 736 (1997). This leads to a fundamental tension—some individuals do choose
“points” that lower their “utility” as measured by those very points; the utility that they
receive is not quantified within the points of the game itself. See id.
16. For example, in her review of Richard Posner’s book Sex and Reason, Robin West
argues,
We cannot and should not rely on the tools of economics to guide our individual
moral judgments and intuitions about right and wrong or good and evil in
matters of sexuality. And if Posner is right that our sexual behaviors are as
rational as our other behaviors, then we should not rely exclusively on economics
to guide our communitarian decisions about the rest of our social life either.
Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2416 (1993) (book
review).
17. Dworkin writes of Richard Posner, “[H]is arguments show the opposite of what he
intended: they show that moral theory cannot be eliminated, and that the moral perspective
is indispensable, even to moral skepticism or relativism. Posner is himself ruled by an
inarticulate, subterranean, unattractive but relentless moral faith.” Ronald Dworkin,
Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1738 (1998).
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to particular tenets of legal doctrine and process.18 Philosophical and
jurisprudential inquiries have long considered this a fundamental
way to approach the study of the legal system.19
This Article considers the intersection of values and the law from
a different, and somewhat less grandiose, perspective. I search not
for a grand unified theory of morals or values in law but instead
consider the legal implications of psychological research on values—
in particular, one area of research in the psychology of values called
social value orientation, hereinafter referred to as SVO. For over
fifty years, social psychologists have extensively studied SVO, which
describes individual preferences in allocating resources between
oneself and others.20 SVO provides a framework for understanding
one’s stance toward outcomes that involve oneself and others.21 In
its simplest terms, SVO asks: Does a person prefer to gain the lion’s
share of resources for herself (proself-individualist), prefer to “win”
relative to another person (proself-competitive), or prefer to equalize
outcomes and expand the available “pie” to its largest potential
(prosocial-cooperative)?22 SVO implicates underlying values about
the relative importance of collective versus individual outcomes, as
well as about equity and inequity in resource distribution.23
SVO is a particularly useful place to start in looking at the role
of the psychology of values in the law, because it takes as its cen-
tral concern individuals’ orientation regarding resource allocation.
Resource allocation is the primary concern of the economic approach
to law that has been widely influential over the last half-century.24
Law and economics posits, as a fundamental underpinning, that
“many of the doctrines and institutions of the legal system are best
understood and explained as efforts to promote the efficient
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See generally Morton Deutsch, The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and
Suspicion, 13 HUM. REL. 123 (1960); David M. Messick & Charles G. McClintock, Motivational
Bases of Choice in Experimental Games, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1968).
21. Wing Tung Au & Jessica Y.Y. Kwong, Measurements and Effects of Social-Value
Orientation in Social Dilemmas: A Review, in CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON
SOCIAL DILEMMAS 71, 71 (Ramzi Suleiman et al. eds., 2004).
22. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 733.
23. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 71.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (8th ed. 2011).
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allocation of resources.”25 Efficiency is defined as an “allocation of
resources in which value is maximized.”26 While law and economics
makes the case for the primacy of efficiency in the allocation of
resources, SVO provides a different perspective on what individuals
want—what they value—when they think about these same re-
source allocation problems.27 Because SVO begins from the same
starting point—questions regarding what goals we have for resource
allocation—it provides a useful lens through which to look at the
law, especially running alongside the law and economics focus on
utility maximization. 
Problems regarding resource allocation, also called social dilem-
mas, are often researched in social science using relatively simple
paradigms that distill the essence of many complex social problems,
including how to get individuals to cooperate when doing so directly
conflicts with their own personal utility.28 Social dilemmas form the
core of social problems, such as adherence to laws that may benefit
society as a whole but will not yield much benefit to any one in-
dividual.29 For example, complying with environmental regulations
may be cumbersome for any one individual, who herself may never
experience the potential benefit that stems from the burden.
Studying social dilemmas is thus of great interest to scholars in a
variety of disciplines, including psychology, economics, and law.
While the field of social dilemmas encompasses many facets, SVO
“is perhaps the most studied individual differences variable in social
dilemmas.”30 However, SVO, per se, has not yet received any sus-
tained attention from legal scholars.31
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16. Note the critical distinction between the two ironically close terms, “value”
and “values”: value is worth, but values are principles. 
27. See infra Part IV.A.
28. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 71-74.
29. See Scott T. Allison et al., The Quest for “Similar Instances” and “Simultaneous
Possibilities”: Metaphors in Social Dilemma Research, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
479, 479 (1996).
30. Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 71.
31. As Paul Van Lange and his colleagues note, “[W]e have seen that anthropologists,
evolutionary biologists, economists, neuroscientists, political scientists, psychologists, and
sociologists increasingly work together to address fundamental questions about human
cooperation.” Paul A.M. Van Lange et al., The Psychology of Social Dilemmas: A Review, 120
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 125, 129 (2013). Van Lange does not
include legal scholars in this litany. See id.
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This Article has two overarching goals: first, to explicitly bring
SVO research into the legal literature and conversation; and second,
to explore how SVO may relate to critical questions about the way
that legal doctrine both reflects and shapes norms and behavior. In
addition, a sustained exploration of SVO also sheds light, as a
collateral but not insignificant matter, on the question of the degree
to which individuals may actually resemble rational utility maxi-
mizers.
Part I offers a view of the landscape of SVO research in psychol-
ogy, providing background and engaging in a deeper discussion of
the distinctions between orientations, data about individual dif-
ferences, demographic data about orientations, implications of
orientations on real behavior, and contextual features that may
activate orientations. Then, armed with a more nuanced psychologi-
cal understanding of how and when individuals are oriented dif-
ferently with respect to social value, and what effects might stem
from different social value orientations, I consider in turn two broad
areas of interest—legal doctrine and legal process.32 Part II
examines the potential intersection between SVO and doctrine in
several areas of law, including contract, corporate, and family law.
Part II explores the way each doctrinal area both makes assump-
tions about, and implicitly shapes, the regulated audience’s SVO. I
chose these particular doctrinal areas in an effort to consider fields
of law in which a lay perspective might imagine, perhaps stereo-
typically, a strong SVO: proself-individualist or proself-competitive
in the case of contract or business law, and prosocial-cooperative in
the case of family law. Part III explores the relationship between
SVO and legal dispute resolution processes, offering an opportunity
to understand how the behavior of parties during the resolution of
disputes is, and could be, shaped by different orientations toward
resource allocation. I suggest ways in which SVO may provide a
basis for thinking differently about both the role of the law and the
design of the legal system in dispute resolution, especially in light
of the research surrounding SVO and perceptions of fairness. Part
IV considers the broader implications of SVO research and the role
of different SVOs in doctrine and process. These implications reveal
32. This Article considers only civil, not criminal, law. 
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the tremendous potential of the SVO paradigm in the law, as well
as the deep lack of inevitability of the primacy of the rational actor
paradigm.
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION
This Part first describes the basic research on SVO, and then
turns to an exploration of the effects that have been connected to
distinct orientations.
A. What Is Social Value Orientation?
In psychology, the field of SVO describes the attitude or stance of
an individual with respect to the allocation of resources between
herself and others.33 SVO among individuals has been divided into
two broad categories, proself and prosocial.34 Proself individuals are
largely concerned with their own outcomes, and prosocial individu-
als care more about the outcome of all parties.35 These broad
categories are further distilled into narrower divisions by various
researchers; dominant categories of SVO include cooperation (pro-
social), individualism (proself), and competition (also proself).36
Individuals with prosocial orientations are concerned with equality
of division between the parties as well as maximizing joint value;
prosocial individuals want to minimize differences in outcome
between the self and other and share in the largest “pie.”37 Prosocial
individuals who are neutral with respect to their own versus an-
other’s performance are deemed cooperative.38 Prosocial behavior
33. Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 71.
34. See id. As discussed in greater detail below, although there may be a moral valence
associated with a prosocial or proself orientation in any given context, SVO per se does not
describe a specific set of moral values and principles; however, it can be a predictor of liberal
or conservative outlook. 
35. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 733.
36. Id. As Au and Kwong note, there have been many efforts over the years to categorize
SVO, leading to models with three, four, seven, and ten labels. Au & Kwong, supra note 21,
at 71. However, most research in the past few decades has relied on a three-category model
involving individualists, competitors, and cooperators. Id. at 76.
37. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 733.
38. See id. Those who prefer to see the other party do better than themselves are called
altruistic, but altruism does not figure prominently in SVO literature, in large part because
it has been found relatively rarely in the context of SVO studies, and will therefore not form
2017] SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 485
stems from an underlying belief in social responsibility (a concern
with others’ outcomes) and reciprocity (a concern for equality in out-
comes).39 Prosocial individuals are motivated by three simultaneous
goals: maximizing their own outcomes, maximizing joint outcomes,
and achieving equality in outcomes.40
In contrast, an individual with proself orientation is most con-
cerned with maximizing her own outcome.41 Proself individuals are
further divided into two camps—proself-individualist and proself-
competitive.42 In a proself-individualist orientation, one is indiffer-
ent to others’ outcomes, focusing merely on ensuring that one’s own
outcome is as high as possible; in a proself-competitive orientation,
one wants to enhance and maximize the difference between the
outcome of oneself and the other party, making relative outcome
more important than absolute outcome.43 Motivation for a proself
orientation comes from self-interest, but the motivation for the pro-
self-competitive orientation also comes from social comparison—a
focus on evaluating oneself through relative position to others—and
a desire to bolster oneself at the expense of others.44 The proself-
individualist orientation closely tracks the assumptions of the
rational actor model: the goal is to maximize one’s own utility,
regardless of the outcome of the other.45
SVO is a unique brand of values research; it does not address, per
se, individuals’ orientation toward specific types of moral or reli-
gious values, such as those that might guide judgments about
controversial topics that typically implicate values, including abor-
tion, gay marriage, and the like. Instead, SVO is concerned with the
distinction between valuations of outcomes with respect to oneself
the basis of the subsequent discussion here. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 73-74.
39. David De Cremer & Paul A.M. Van Lange, Why Prosocials Exhibit Greater Cooper-
ation than Proselfs: The Roles of Social Responsibility and Reciprocity, 15 EUR. J.
PERSONALITY S5, S14 (Supp. 2001).
40. Id. at S15.
41. See id. at S7.
42. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 733.
43. See id.
44. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117, 118-19
(1954). For a more recent approach, see generally Stephen M. Garcia et al., The Psychology
of Competition: A Social Comparison Perspective, 8 PERSPS. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 634 (2013). 
45. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 733.
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and to another.46 SVO primarily represents different perspectives
regarding the division of resources in society.47 However, as dis-
cussed in greater detail below, resources may not always be purely
economic in nature: legal endowments can be considered a form of
resources,48 as can access to, and the nature of, legal process.49
Although many legal endowments are about the division of economic
resources, some are harder to cast in those terms alone—for ex-
ample, the right to marry50 or abortion rights.51 Nonetheless, even
though SVO does not encompass moral principles relating expressly
to these controversial areas of the law, SVO may influence the na-
ture of arguments that are made regarding these issues. Courts and
advocates may use rhetoric and arguments that reflect inherently
prosocial or proself views of society, and also may understand legal
rights as a particular type of resource that must be allocated among
the members of a group.
Research has found robust individual differences in “baseline”
SVO—individual differences that, in the aggregate, pose a chal-
lenge to the assumptions of the rational actor model.52 Additionally,
and perhaps more importantly for the relationship between SVO
and the legal system, research suggests that some differences in
SVO may depend on contextual cues.53 Although individuals may
46. See Ryan O. Murphy et al., Measuring Social Value Orientation, 6 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 771, 771 (2011).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 91 (2010) (noting the “goods at stake” in debates over same-sex
marriage). 
49. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
50. Of course, the right to have a legally recognized marriage can impact economic
resources. See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Value of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples,
58 DRAKE L. REV. 1081, 1115 (2010) (“Overall, the evidence for the economic value of marriage
is strong, suggesting same-sex couples are harmed economically when not allowed to marry.”).
At an even more abstract level, the differential recognition of family ties and relationships by
the law can “increase inequalities of wealth and opportunity, since closer families may be
more likely to distribute resources within their family.” EICHNER, supra note 48, at 107.
51. That is not to say that abortion rights are completely unconnected to economic
resources. Those with greater financial resources may have better access to legal abortion
through travel, and those who are unable to access abortion may end up with a greater
financial burden due to childbirth and childcare expenses. See, e.g., E.B., Abortion in America:
A Costly Choice, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyin
america/2014/10/abortion-america [https://perma.cc/655S-DUJE].
52. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
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have predispositions regarding orientations toward social value,54
both culture and context help to promote SVOs. Field research
suggests that culture plays an important role in fostering social
value-related behavior; SVO relates to the distinction between
collectivist and individualistic cultures, for example.55 Laboratory
studies indicate that manipulating contextual cues can change
individuals’ SVO and related behavior; such cues can trigger more
prosocial or more proself behavior, depending on what behavior is
suggested as expected, desired, or conforming to norms.56
Like many personality measures, SVO is measured through tests
that have been extensively developed and tweaked over the years.57
SVO is typically measured by offering an individual a series of
matched pairs of outcomes to choose among.58 For example, out of an
array of paired choices, an individual who most often chooses a pair
that maximizes joint outcomes rather than merely her own out-
comes would be classified as a cooperative individual.59 An individu-
al who more often chooses the options yielding her the highest total,
regardless of the cost or benefit to the other party, would be called
individualistic, while an individual who systematically chooses the
pairings that would result in the greatest differential between her-
self and the other party would be considered competitive.60
As an illustration, a measure of SVO might ask a participant to
choose among three options:
 
54. See Van Lange et al., supra note 15, at 743-44 (suggesting that SVO develops in
childhood as at least a partial response to situational factors surrounding social interaction).
Interestingly, prosocials are more likely to have greater numbers of siblings, and there is also
little apparent difference between the sexes with respect to patterns of SVO. Id. at 743.
55. See, e.g., Craig D. Parks & Anh D. Vu, Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from
Highly Individualist and Collectivist Cultures, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 708, 709-10 (1994).
56. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
57. For a nuanced exploration of the various measurement tools of SVO, see Murphy et
al., supra note 46, at 771-72.
58. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 72.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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(1) Option A: 480 points for self and 80 points for other;61
(2) Option B: 540 points for self and 280 points for other; and
(3) Option C: 480 points for self and 480 points for other.62
In this set of choices, because Option A represents the largest
difference between self and other, that is the most competitive
choice.63 Option B represents an individualist outcome because it
produces the highest outcome for oneself.64 Finally, Option C
provides the greatest joint outcome, with an equal division of re-
sources, and so it represents the prosocial, cooperative choice.65 SVO
is measured through the use of a questionnaire that provides a
series of these types of choices.66 Other options presented to the test
taker could include choices in which an individual received the
highest amount out of an array, but the partner received even more,
testing the distinction between competitive and individualist ori-
entations.
61. I note here that the decomposed games do not specify a particular “other,” which of
course may influence the general predilection regarding the allocation of resources. Paul A.M.
Van Lange et al., From Games to Giving: Social Value Orientation Predicts Donations to Noble
Causes, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 375, 377 (2007). The division of resources that one
might choose as between oneself and, respectively, a stranger, a neighbor, a spouse, or a child,
could differ. See id. However, the lack of specificity in the SVO literature tracks the assump-
tions underlying the rational actor model, which typically presumes an actor who wants to
maximize utility for herself in the vague face of all typically unspecified others. See Van Lange
et al., supra note 15, at 733.
In addition, because the paradigm does not specify the identity of the “other,” we could
potentially assume that participants imagine a range of others, and that if that imagined
“other” is randomly distributed among participants (that is, some imagine a friend, some a
stranger, etc., but in no systemic pattern), then the identification of SVO would be “true”
across conditions. Even if that assumption is wrong, and those who are more prosocial
individuals may be more likely to imagine others with whom they are more connected, while
individualists and/or competitors are more prone to imagine a neutral other, a stranger other,
or even a hostile other, this projection of a type of other onto an indeterminate term is also
telling. When individuals think about legal obligations and distribution of liability or rights
between themselves and others, they too have to “imagine” which “other” is implicated. 
62. Van Lange et al., supra note 61, at 377. 
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Daniel Eek & Tommy Gärling, A New Look at the Theory of Social Value
Orientations: Prosocials Neither Maximize Joint Outcome nor Minimize Outcome Differences
but Prefer Equal Outcomes, in NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS
10, 11 (Anders Biel et al. eds., 2008) (describing decomposed games and explaining that an
individualist would prefer an outcome of 560 points to self and 300 points to other, while a
competitor would choose an outcome of 500 points to self and 100 points to other).
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Research shows that individuals vary in their orientations. A
meta-analysis by Wing Tung Au and Jessica Y.Y. Kwong suggests
that, without prior manipulation, priming, or contextual cues, the
population of individuals studied is divided roughly between
prosocials (46 percent) and proselfs (individualists, 25 percent;
competitors, 13 percent).67 This meta-analysis considered the re-
sults of all studies of so-called “decomposed games” (described above
as selections of matched pairings) published since 1973, including
forty-seven individual studies.68 These results suggest that the
rational utility-maximizing actor, although a tidy paradigm, does
not accurately represent the majority of individuals.69 This is a key
finding that challenges the vitality and applicability of the rational
actor model.70
Much of the research on SVO takes place in European countries,
so it is important to consider whether these findings hold up in the
United States. Another recent meta-analysis by Daniel Balliet and
his colleagues looked at eighty-two SVO studies, including fifteen
that focused either exclusively or in part on participants from the
United States, and found a similar pattern of prosocial individuals
as the one identified in the earlier Au and Kwong review.71
B. What Are the Effects of Social Value Orientation?
Merely understanding that individuals might prefer different
resource allocations in a series of decomposed choices with an
unspecified “other,” however, does not tell us what effects such mea-
sured preferences might have on real behavior. But research
suggests that SVO has a host of effects on actual behavior. Individu-
als allocate real resources in games in accordance with measured
67. Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 74 (listing values that represent medians found from
the meta-analysis); see also Murphy et al., supra note 46, at 775 (finding that 59 percent of
individuals are prosocial, 35 percent are individualist, and the remainder are either
unclassifiable or competitive). 
68. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 73.
69. See id. at 74.
70. But see Murphy et al., supra note 46, at 771 (“[C]onsidering a spectrum of different
SVOs is not a challenge to rational choice theory per se, but rather the extension of a postulate
in an effort to increase the theory’s psychological realism and descriptive accuracy.”); see also
Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 90.
71. Daniel Balliet et al., Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas:
A Meta-Analysis, 12 GROUP PROCESS & INTERGROUP REL. 533, 537-40 (2009).
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social value preferences.72 In addition, individuals’ SVO is a relevant
predictor of other types of real-world behavior that may benefit
societal groups rather than individual self-interest.73 Finally, SVO
significantly correlates with other important psychological processes
beyond allocation of resources and social behavior, such as percep-
tions of fairness and legitimacy.74 Research indicates that individu-
als with different SVOs assess fairness of process differently, and
make both procedural and distributive justice judgments along
different dimensions.75
SVO has been linked to significant differences in behavior in
decision-making settings.76 For example, SVO predicts behavior in
empirical studies.77 Individuals who measure as cooperative through
an SVO measurement tool display greater actual cooperation in
experimental games involving the distribution of resources, such as
the prisoner’s dilemma, the ultimatum game, and the dictator game,
than individuals who have been classified as individualists and
competitors.78 SVO significantly influences the outcome of such
games, directly affecting how the “pie” is divided among partici-
pants.79
SVO correlates not just with outcomes but also with process
behaviors, such as the strategic use of fairness in negotiation.
Proself individuals, for example, are tougher and less problem-
solving in negotiation settings.80 Researchers distinguish between
72. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
76. See Balliet et al., supra note 71, at 543. 
77. See, e.g., Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Terry L. Boles, Share and Share Alike or Winner
Take All?: The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon Choice and Recall of Negotiation
Heuristics, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 253, 256 (1998); Sylvia
G. Roch et al., Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of Resource
Overconsumption in Small Groups, 83 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
185, 205-06 (2000); Sylvia G. Roch & Charles D. Samuelson, Effects of Environmental
Uncertainty and Social Value Orientation in Resource Dilemmas, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 221, 229 (1997).
78. See Charles G. McClintock & Wim B.G. Liebrand, Role of Interdependence Structure,
Individual Value Orientation, and Another’s Strategy in Social Decision Making: A Transfor-
mational Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 396, 407 (1988). 
79. See generally id.
80. See Eric van Dijk et al., Social Value Orientations and the Strategic Use of Fairness
in Ultimatum Bargaining, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 697, 705 (2004).
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true concern for fairness, demonstrated by prosocials, and strategic
use of fairness by proselfs.81 Interestingly, this suggests that proself
individuals may be more sensitive to environmental cues than
prosocial individuals.82 This is particularly surprising because other
research demonstrates that prosocial individuals are more likely to
demonstrate “behavioral assimilation.”83 Behavioral assimilation
means that if an individual is presented with cooperation, she will
cooperate; if an individual is presented with self-interested behav-
ior, she will reciprocate with self-interested behavior.84 But respon-
siveness to one’s surroundings is qualitatively different for proself
and prosocial individuals; proself individuals continue to maintain
their goal of maximizing their own outcome, but may adjust their
behavior, strategically and if necessary, to achieve this goal.85 In
contrast, prosocials are more responsive as a matter of reciprocity.86
Indeed, this desire for reciprocity may even lead to a preference for
equality over joint outcome maximization.87
SVO also relates to real world, outside-the-lab behavior such as
donations to social causes. Prosocials donate more to others—SVO
is particularly predictive of donations to the poor and the sick.88
81. Id. at 704.
82. See id. at 704-05.
83. De Cremer & Van Lange, supra note 39, at S14; Paul A.M. Van Lange, The Pursuit
of Joint Outcomes and Equality in Outcomes: An Integrative Model of Social Value Orienta-
tion, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 337, 347 (1999). 
84. See Van Lange, supra note 83, at 338.
85. See Daniel Eek & Tommy Gärling, Prosocials Prefer Equal Outcomes to Maximizing
Joint Outcomes, 45 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 321, 333 (2006).
86. See id.
87. See id. Although Daniel Eek and Tommy Gärling make a strong case for prosocials’
preference of equality over joint outcome maximization, in contrast to earlier work on
prosocials, I remain largely agnostic here on that distinction. Part of the problem with using
the distinction at this juncture is that earlier meta-analyses such as the Au and Kwong review
do not make the distinction between studies that measured prosocials in equality terms
versus joint outcome maximization terms, making it hard to parse the true meaning of this
distinction for conclusions in earlier work about the size of the prosocial population. See
generally Au & Kwong, supra note 21. In this Article, I engage with SVO on its own, broadly
defined terms. Certainly, more nuance in understanding the ways in which individuals
approach resource allocations, with categories defined in more finely grained terms than
current SVO research permits, would be helpful to further discussion. To the extent that this
suggests that SVO is a fairly blunt object, that is true, but by no means disqualifying; it
certainly provides more nuance than an assumption that individuals are (or should be) driven
by a desire to maximize their own outcomes. 
88. See Van Lange et al., supra note 61, at 380-81. 
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Prosocial individuals are more likely than proself individuals to take
public transportation and to link that decision to issues of collective
welfare.89 SVO also significantly affects individuals’ perceptions of
procedure.90 Fairness assessments may differ depending on the SVO
of the participant in the process; individuals who measure as proself
have a more heightened sensitivity to whether or not they have had
a voice in a particular process, leading to what Jan-Willem van
Prooijen and his colleagues call the “egocentric justice hypothesis.”91
Prosocial individuals care most about the equality of procedures,
while proselfs mainly assess their own procedures without regard
to others’ experiences.92
C. Social Value Orientation as More than a Personality
 Dimension: Social Value Orientation and Context
Law and economics presumes a rational actor at least in part
because it permits clearer and more logical predictions than other
assumptions.93 Heuristics and biases, and prospect theory more
generally, have been embraced by economists—even “creating” the
field of behavioral economics94 and behavioral law and economics—
because systematic effects across populations mean that predictions
about (predictably irrational) behavior may be possible.95 Not everyone
89. Mark Van Vugt et al., Car Versus Public Transportation? The Role of Social Value
Orientations in a Real-Life Social Dilemma, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 274 (1995).
90. Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al., The Egocentric Nature of Procedural Justice: Social
Value Orientation as Moderator of Reactions to Decision-Making Procedures, 44 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1303, 1303-04 (2008).
91. Id. at 1305. 
92. Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al., Injustice for All or Just for Me? Social Value Orienta-
tion Predicts Responses to Own Versus Other’s Procedures, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1247, 1254 (2012).
93. Indeed, part of the point of such economic predictions is to expressly “abstract[ ] the
common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances sur-
rounding the phenomena to be explained and permit[ ] valid predictions on the basis of them
alone.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 14 (1966); see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 21 (“[L]ack of realism ... is a
precondition of theory.”).
94. See Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, and Future, 106 AM.
ECON. REV. 1577, 1597 (2016) (noting that behavioral economics can be traced right back to
Adam Smith, and that perhaps in the future the word “behavioral” will be dropped to reflect
the fundamental role of human behavior in economics).
95. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 239-40 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
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is affected by these cognitive distortions, but many people across a
range of studies and contexts are.96 Even some of the other chal-
lenges to the rational actor paradigm, such as procedural justice
research, similarly rely on the broad applicability of supporting
findings: procedural justice effects are robust across populations,
settings, and individuals.97 Again, although some individuals may
not be affected by concerns about fairness of process, or may feel the
effects less strongly, the research suggests largely consistent and
significant effects across populations.98 The strength and consis-
tency of procedural justice findings suggest that we could incorpo-
rate insights from procedural justice research into legal process to
increase the perceived fairness and legitimacy of our legal system
across the population at large.99 
SVO, however, is distinct because it does not represent some
shared phenomenon with individual shades of variation, such as
procedural justice or framing effects.100 Instead, SVO is explicitly
about differences, and has sometimes been characterized as a per-
sonality variable—a particularized and ex ante unknowable differ-
ence among individuals.101 As such, it might be tempting to conclude
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7-8 (2008).
96. See, e.g., Thaler, supra note 94, at 1581.
97. See infra Part III.A.
98. See infra Part III.A.
99. Procedural justice effects are found in settings including, but not limited to, the civil
and criminal legal system, alternative dispute resolution, the workplace, and the family. See,
e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483,
503 (1988); Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Disputes: A
Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning in Late Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH
& ADOLESCENCE 101, 102 (1998); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Reso-
lution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 235-36
(1993); Jennie J. Long, Compliance in Small Claims Court: Exploring the Factors Associated
with Defendants’ Level of Compliance with Mediated and Adjudicated Outcomes, 21 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 139, 140-41 (2003); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’
Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 333, 346-47 (1988); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 327 (1993).
100. See supra Part I.A.
101. See supra Part I.A. Although the exact nature of personality variables is a complex
problem well outside the scope of this Article, personality variables are understood in
personality psychology literature to require external measurement: as one author explained,
“[T]he strength of a personality variable in a given person is indexed by the proportion of
times that he makes a particular response in a specified situation.” Donald W. Fiske,
Problems in Measuring Personality, in CONCEPTS OF PERSONALITY 449, 459 (Joseph M.
Wepman & Ralph W. Heine eds., 1963).
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that SVO cannot possibly be a meaningful distinction upon which
to ground any kind of legal framework or doctrine, or even any
analysis of such doctrine. Other personality variables, such as those
that comprise the “Big Five” of personality research in psychol-
ogy—extraversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and
neuroticism—differ greatly among individuals.102 While these var-
iables provide tremendously useful information and can predict
behavior,103 we might find it odd to analyze the role of, say, extrover-
sion in the legal system, or to even consider what assumptions the
law does or should make about agreeableness, or to find interesting
or useful an examination of existing law along the lines of neuroti-
cism. Personality variables are simply too unpredictable and vari-
egated to make this a worthwhile endeavor, this argument might go.
Just as we would not craft or analyze the law based on, say, open-
ness, we could argue that we ought not fall down the SVO rabbit
hole and use SVO as the basis for policy or doctrine or look for
insights into the law through an SVO lens.
Yet SVO is different from more traditional psychological personal-
ity variables that make up the “Big Five” of personality research.
Although researchers understand that personality variables are not
absolutes and may be subject to some change, either in different
settings or over time, personality variables are largely conceptual-
ized as fixed and fairly stable traits.104 For example, merely attend-
ing a lively dinner party will not change an individual with strong
introversion tendencies into a chatterbox. But research indicates
that SVO and its related behavior are highly susceptible to social
cues and context.105 In one study, researchers found that merely
102. See generally Oliver P. John, The “Big Five” Factor Taxonomy: Dimensions of Person-
ality in the Natural Language and in Questionnaires, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY
AND RESEARCH 66, 71-73 (Lawrence A. Pervin ed., 1990) (providing overview and history of
the five-factor model).
103. See Brent W. Roberts et al., The Power of Personality: The Comparative Validity of
Personality Traits, Socioeconomic Status, and Cognitive Ability for Predicting Important Life
Outcomes, 2 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 313, 336 (2007).
104. Gabriela Carrasco & Eric Kinnamon, An Examination of Selfish and Selfless Motives:
A Review of the Social Psychological and Behavioral Economics Literature, in APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH AND TRENDS 93, 98 (Rodica Ianole ed., 2017).
105. See Craig D. Parks & Anh D. Vu, Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from Highly
Individualist and Collectivist Cultures, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 708, 715 (1994). Similarly,
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch noted, in the legal context, that “[w]e act with mixed motives that
fluctuate depending on social cues and context.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating
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changing the name of a prisoner’s dilemma game affected partici-
pants’ goals regarding resource allocation between themselves and
others in the game dramatically.106 When participants were told
that they were participating in the “Wall Street Game,” they acted
significantly more competitive toward their opponents than when
they were told that they were participating in the “Community
Game.”107 This difference in behavior occurred even though the rules
of the game were identical in both settings and participants were
given the same goal—to maximize their utility.108 Suggesting that
the overarching setting of one game was Wall Street—where norms
of wealth acquisition run rampant109—made participants act com-
petitively, while suggesting that the setting of the other game was
a “community” invoked norms of cooperation and communal in-
terests, prompting cooperative behavior.110 Relatedly, a large-scale
cross-cultural study found significant differences in behavior during
the ultimatum game, suggesting that some of individuals’ orienta-
tion toward resource allocation must come from cultural cues.111
In sum, SVO is a “personality” variable, but it is not just about
personality. Rather, SVO can be highly influenced by social context,
such as a legal framework providing norms regarding behavior in
different settings.112 As one researcher suggested, “[S]ocial value ori-
entation reflects dispositions that are at least somewhat stable yet
open to modification, particularly over a relatively longer period of
time.”113 Additionally, SVO is expressly about how individuals func-
tion in groups in ways that are relevant to legally governable be-
Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 135 (2011). 
106. See Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1182 (2004).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1176-77.
109. As Gordon Gekko explains in the 1987 movie Wall Street, “Greed is good.” See WALL
STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
110. But see Tore Ellingsen et al., Social Framing Effects: Preferences or Beliefs?, 76 GAMES
& ECON. BEHAV. 117, 128 (2012) (finding results that suggest framing effects signal coordina-
tion around a norm rather than trigger a change in desires by participants). 
111. See Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 813 (2005). 
112. See Liberman, supra note 106, at 1182.
113. Van Lange, supra note 83, at 343 n.6.
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havior.114 Much of the law is about the appropriate allocation of
resources between the self and others, as well as about governing
individual behavior in light of collective societal goals.115 Unlike
personality traits of introversion/extroversion, agreeableness, neu-
roticism, or others, SVO directly relates to attitudes and behaviors
that are critical to the successful functioning of the legal system.116
As such, it is worth considering how SVO may relate to predictions
about legal behavior and norms reflected by legal doctrine.
II. SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION IN THE LAW
This Part considers several diverse areas of legal doctrine and the
potential connection between that doctrine and SVO. Because law
governs so many potential human interactions, it is worthwhile to
consider doctrinal areas that, at least at first glance, appear to
address dramatically different contexts. This Part is by no means an
exhaustive and in-depth examination of particular doctrinal areas.
Rather, I suggest that SVO is a useful lens that can provide some
meaningful insight into how we might think about underlying
values expressed through different doctrines and begin that ex-
ploration. Here, I look first at corporate and contract law, which are
often perceived as largely focused on rational actors and typically
are thought to consider economic gain paramount.117 Then, I
consider family law, which governs individuals in the private sphere
of their personal lives, where issues related to interpersonal
connection and relationships are more prominent.118 In these areas,
I consider what thinking about doctrine in terms of, and in light of,
SVO might reveal.
Because of the differences in the nature of these doctrinal areas,
an examination of the relevant law’s SVO assumptions and impli-
cations should be particularly revealing. For example, although
corporate law and contract law appear at first glance to be focused
on rational profit seeking, the law also encompasses doctrines that
114. See supra Part I.A.
115. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part I.A.
117. See infra Parts II.A-B.
118. See infra Part II.C.
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are extremely prosocial and encouraging of cooperative behavior.119
In contrast, the casual observer might imagine that family law,
governing relationships between individuals in family systems,
would encapsulate cooperative values.120 Yet family law doctrine
and theory can be quite individualistic.121 This analysis of legal
doctrine and theory through the lens of psychological research on
preferences regarding resource allocation provides insight for the
law and legal scholars about the nature of “rational actors,” values,
and the role of the law.
A. Corporate Law
Corporate law has traditionally been perceived as the realm of
individualism and competition. The notion that “greed is good” is
the mantra of Wall Street—and not just for movie villains.122
Players in the corporate world are expected to use every advantage
to reap higher and higher profits—and higher and higher salaries.123
In his book Liar’s Poker, Michael Lewis describes a culture of
gambling, hazing, and one-upmanship that permeates the trading
desks at Salomon Brothers.124 Portraying characters he calls
“Sangfroid” and the “Human Piranha,” Lewis depicts the firm’s
training for new recruits as a parade of capitalist indoctrination in
which trainees learn how to be ruthless.125 According to Frank
Partnoy in his book F.I.A.S.C.O., the mentality of Wall Street is that
investment banking is like war, and he further states that “[w]hen
an account called to say hello, I needed to be prepared to blow his
head off, if necessary, to make a sale.”126 Both Partnoy and Lewis
describe traders referring to “ripping [a client’s] face off ” (unironi-
cally, if not literally) as part of a business deal.127 The frame is an
119. See infra Parts II.A-B.
120. See supra Part II.C.
121. See supra Part II.C.
122. See WALL STREET, supra note 109.
123. See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL STREET
202-03 (1989).
124. See id. at 120-21.
125. Id. at 39-41, 70, 72.
126. FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET 108 (1997).
127. PARTNOY, supra note 126, at 61; LEWIS, supra note 123, at 71.
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entirely competitive one: it is not enough simply to make money; the
other party has to lose.128
While corporate and securities law has never endorsed such a
bellicose perspective, it is thought to at least follow an individual-
istic SVO. The foundation for American corporate law is the norm
of shareholder primacy: namely, that corporate directors and officers
are there to govern the corporation in the interests of the sharehold-
ers.129 The doctrine is generally traced back to Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that Henry Ford
had improperly failed to provide Ford’s shareholders with a divi-
dend.130 The court famously stated: “A business corporation is or-
ganized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockhold-
ers.”131 In determining that the company must issue a dividend, the
court noted that there was an important distinction between poten-
tially allowable “incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate
funds for the benefit of the employés [sic]” and an impermissible
“general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of
others.”132 Although the power of the shareholder primacy norm is
hotly debated in academic circles,133 the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery recently reaffirmed the basic principle.134
128. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
129. In fact, Milton Friedman famously disclaimed any other purpose for a corporation
other than the drive to maximize the returns to shareholders. Milton Friedman, A Friedman
Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1970, at SM17; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-
Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34 (2012) (“[S]tockholders’
best interest must always, within legal limits, be the end. Other [corporate] constituencies
may be considered only instrumentally to advance that end.”).
130. 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919).
131. Id. at 684.
132. Id.
133. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
163, 176 (2008) (“Corporations seek profits for shareholders, but they seek other things, as
well, including specific investment, stakeholder benefits, and their own continued existence.
Teaching Dodge v. Ford as anything but an example of judicial mistake obstructs under-
standing of this reality.”).
134. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties
and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”); see also Matthew T. Bodie, The
Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2012) (“Although the vibrancy of shareholder primacy has at times
been called into question as a matter of law, both boardrooms and courts have taken the
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The theory behind the shareholder primacy norm is that share-
holders are the most vulnerable set of stakeholders in the corpora-
tion and, therefore, deserve to hold the power over the rest of the
stakeholders.135 According to the theory, shareholders have control
rights because they are entitled to the residual profits that the
corporation generates.136 Because all other stakeholders in the
corporation—namely, employees, suppliers, and customers—are
entitled to their contractual claims before profits are paid, share-
holders are in the best position to maximize the overall wealth
generated by the corporation.137 Under this theory of corporate gov-
ernance, all the sets of players act in their own self-interest, and the
players with the last bite at the apple have overriding power in
order to make sure that they get their fair share.138 This perspective
on corporate structure is very individualistic in nature, as it as-
sumes that each group will act in its own (collective) self-interest.139
Despite these competitive and individualist norms, however,
much of corporate law centers around prosocial norms. When
dealing with matters internal to the firm, the law often expects co-
operation rather than competition.140 As representatives of the
shareholder electorate, the board of directors is expected to act on
behalf of the shareholders and owes fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty to both the shareholders and the corporation itself.141 Although
normative call for shareholder wealth maximization increasingly to heart. There is little doubt
that the revolution has not only substantially affected legal theory but also legislation, court
decisions, and corporate behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
135. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 67-68.
139. See id.
140. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
141. See id. (“In performing their duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care to the corporation and its shareholders.”). Directors may also arguably owe
a duty of good faith to the corporation. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in
Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2006) (“An important development in corporate law
is the explicit recognition in recent cases that corporate managers—directors and officers—
owe a duty of good faith in addition to their duties of care and loyalty.”). However, the
Delaware Supreme Court has described the duty of good faith as a subsidiary element or
condition of the duty of loyalty. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’
of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good
faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
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the duty of care is limited by the business judgment rule,142 the duty
of loyalty is, essentially, a duty to act in the best interests of the
other.143 Directors have a responsibility to act in the interests of the
corporation and the shareholders—not themselves—when they are
performing their roles within the corporation.144 The officers that
the directors appoint, such as the chief executive and financial
officers, also owe these duties to the corporation.145 Majority share-
holders also owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, which generally
inure to the protection of minority shareholders.146
These duties carry over to other types of business organizations
as well. In one of the most famous business law cases, Meinhard v.
Salmon, the Court of Appeals of New York explained that the duty
to one’s own partners was much higher than to another person:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.... Only thus
has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd.147
In particular, the court said, the defendant Walter Salmon was not
guilty of defrauding his partners.148 The court acknowledged that he
was not acting with ill intent or in a way that implicated moral
the duties of care and loyalty.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 945, 955-56 (1989).
143. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“Essentially, the duty
of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and
not shared by the stockholders generally.”), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
144. See id.
145. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (“[C]orporate officers owe
fiduciary duties that are identical to those owed by corporate directors.”).
146. NHB Assignments LLC v. Gen. Atl. LLC (In re PMTS Liquidating Corp.), 452 B.R.
498, 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“[U]nder both Florida and Delaware law, a majority share-
holder unquestionably owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation.”).
147. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
148. See id. at 548.
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issues of right and wrong.149 Nonetheless, Salmon breached his
fiduciary duty to his partner, because he “had put himself in a
position in which thought of self was to be renounced, however hard
the abnegation.”150 In the language of SVO, Salmon’s behavior
marked him as an individualist, but the court held him to the
standard of cooperator.151 Partners in a partnership owe one another
a duty of loyalty that must supersede individual self-interest.152
Of course, these fiduciary duties do not turn directors and part-
ners into self-abnegating altruists. But they do seek to balance the
competitive aspects of the market with the cooperative nature of
team production. Corporate law looks to police both ends of the
continuum—the perils of extreme self-interest, on one hand, must
be guarded against, and we must remind individuals of the need to
cooperate. On the other hand, too much cooperation is unacceptable
and parties may need to be reminded of the primacy of self-interest.
This balancing act is evident in takeover law.153 In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
required directors to maximize shareholder returns when conduct-
ing an auction for the sale of control of the corporation.154 Once the
sale of the company was ensured, “[t]he duty of the board had thus
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”155 In other words, the directors’ duty was “getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”156
However, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the
same court held that Time could take evasive actions to avoid an ex-
tremely generous buyout offer from Paramount.157 The court stated
that “absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon,
a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed
manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value
149. See id.
150. Id. at 548.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 546.
153. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1989).
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in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.”158 The court
also recognized that the board may take into account a variety of
factors in defending against a hostile takeover, including “the im-
pact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders.”159 By supporting
a more ecumenical approach to the best interests of the firm, the
court allowed for a more communitarian approach by the corpo-
ration’s board.160
Indeed, there are indications that courts and companies may be
moving away from the notion that shareholder wealth maximization
should be the corporation’s ultimate purpose. The U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the potential goals of a corporation in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.161 The majority held that for-profit compa-
nies could have religious and other “not profit” motivations too:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of
everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations,
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.... If for-
profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is
no apparent reason why they may not further religious objec-
tives as well.162
At the same time, however, the Court seemed to put the power to
exercise religious beliefs largely in the hands of the shareholders.163
Noting the unanimity of the litigant companies’ shareholders as to
their religious beliefs, the Court seemed to base the corporation’s
religious identity primarily on shareholder religious identity.164 To
this extent, Hobby Lobby allows shareholders to pursue their
158. Id. at 1150.
159. Id. at 1153 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985)).
160. See id.
161. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
162. Id. at 2771.
163. See id. at 2774.
164. See id.
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individual religious beliefs by escaping government-imposed
benefits for their employees.165
The “expressive function”166 of corporate law thus points in two
directions: one, a self-interested individualist direction, and the
other, a cooperative direction, concerned for joint outcome and
shared benefits.167 These contrasting SVOs act together to police the
boundaries of the corporate form itself. On the one hand, the
expressive function decries the cooperator who seeks joint value for
others outside of the corporate form per se (à la Ford Motor Co.),168
and on the other hand decries the individualist who seeks benefit
outside the corporate form (à la Salmon).169 Individualist orientation
on behalf of the firm is good, and cooperation within the firm is
good, but individualist orientation on behalf of an actual individ-
ual—both within and outside of the firm—and cooperation with
others outside the firm, are both undesirable.
B. Contracts
For decades, contract law has been the province of law and
economics scholars; as Eric Posner noted, “[E]conomic analysis of
contract law ... has become the dominant academic style of contract
theory.”170 Contract law is particularly susceptible to the lure of a
cost-benefit analysis since it is predicated on the idea that people
bargain for an exchange of money, goods, or duties with a clear eye
toward weighing costs and benefits.171 The economic analysis of
165. See id. at 2785.
166. The expressive function of the law is “in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling
behavior directly.” Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2024 (1996).
167. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2014) (“[C]onsider the possibility that corporate governance politics, like
politics more generally, may have a significant ‘symbolic’ element.”); Edward B. Rock, Saints
and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997)
(“[T]he Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct (which
influence the development of the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) largely
through what can best be thought of as ‘corporate law sermons.’”).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
170. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 829 (2003). 
171. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 691 (1986) (discussing the parties’ cost-benefit analysis
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contract law assumes that “individuals have preferences over
outcomes, that these preferences obey basic consistency conditions,
and that individuals satisfy these preferences subject to an exoge-
nous budget constraint. Contracts scholars usually assume that
individuals do not have preferences regarding the consumption or
well-being of other individuals.”172
In particular, the doctrine of efficient breach is a high-water mark
for the role of the rational actor.173 If one contracts in one setting,
but finds that it is better for one’s own self-interest to breach—that
is, even after accounting for the cost of breach, one is still better off
economically by breaching—then one ought to be able to breach a
contract without additional repercussions.174 Of course, there are
critics of this approach, who argue that the purely economic under-
standing of contractual obligation misses an important component
of contract law—namely, the moral importance of a promise.175
Efficient breach reflects an inherently proself-individualist vision.176
One does not consider the relative benefit to the other party after
breach (a proself-competitive orientation), or the joint benefits or the
equality of the outcomes between the contracting parties (a prosocial
perspective).177 Instead, one merely looks to the position in which
one will find oneself—and oneself alone—after any consequent
benefits and damages from the breach are tallied.178
over contingencies in contract formation).
172. Posner, supra note 170, at 832.
173. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (analyzing liquidated damages clauses in the
context of efficient breach).
174. See id. at 558-59.
175. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981) (arguing for a moral basis of contract law); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 712 (2007) (“Legal rules must be
constructed and justified in ways that take into account the fact that law embodies a system
of rules and practices that moral agents inhabit, enforce, and are subject to alongside other
aspects of their lives, especially their moral agency.”). 
176. Efficient breach defenders explain that efficient breach essentially fills in terms of a
contract that is not fully complete—terms that both parties would have agreed to ex ante if
only the particulars of the ensuing situation had been apparent. See Kornhauser, supra note
171, at 691-92.
177. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 173, at 558-59.
178. See id.
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Recent scholarship interrogates “the assumption that individuals
uniformly perceive their consent as creating a legal obligation [that]
lies at the heart of contractual obedience.”179 In particular, research
focuses on the way that framing a contract can influence contract
adherence. For example, one study found that when a contract
included a liquidated damages clause—an express structure
designed to compensate for breach of contract—individuals were
more willing to engage in efficient breach of the contract than when
a contract did not include such a clause.180 The study thus indicated
that moral intuitions surrounding contractual promises may provide
a disincentive to breaching a contract even when it might maximize
economic utility to do so, but that the liquidated damages clause
allowed individuals to feel better about maximizing self-interest.181
Another way of considering these results is that the liquidated
damages term was helpful in expressing the individualist SVO and
sent contextual cues to participants that an individualist approach
was called for and even expected.
Relatedly, another study recently found that appeals to moral
frameworks were more predictive of adherence to contractual
obligations than were appeals to legal incentives and deterrents.182
In this study, participants made a contract to complete survey
research and were then asked to complete an intentionally prohibi-
tively lengthy survey.183 When, as expected, many of them tried to
end their involvement prior to completing the contracted-for task,
the participants were prompted to complete the task with either a
legal, moral, instrumental, or social prompt.184 The legal prompt
reminded participants that they signed a contract, the moral prompt
exhorted participants to “live up to their word,” and the instrumen-
tal prompt reminded participants of the promised “reward” for
completion.185 Finally, the social prompt indicated that most par-
ticipants completed the task, asking for completion by reference to
179. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of
Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 69 (2012). 
180. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 663 (2010).
181. Id. at 663-64.
182. See Eigen, supra note 179, at 70.
183. Id. at 72-73, 78.
184. Id. at 81.
185. Id.
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social conformity.186 The moral prompt was the most successful in
encouraging completion, while the legal prompt alone was far less
successful.187 The least successful prompt was the instrumental
prompt, which reminded participants of the incentive structure of
the task.188 The social prompt was not as effective as the moral
prompt, but exceeded the performance of the legal and instrumental
prompts.189 The study’s results suggest that the SVO that is acti-
vated by certain prompts impacts behavior.190 Here, the proself-
individualist prompt failed to produce compliance with the contract;
the prosocial-cooperation prompt was better, but not as good as an
express appeal to morality.191
In another study that illustrates the potential role of SVO in the
contract compliance setting, researchers in Israel discovered that
imposing fines on parents who were late in picking up their children
at a day care center increased, rather than decreased, the frequency
of late pickups.192 Although economics would predict that increasing
the price (here, imposing a price on a previously free behavior) of an
action would reduce the frequency of the action,193 the imposition of
the fine instead appeared to change the perspective of the parents
at the center.194 Previously, the researchers suggested, the parents
were motivated to pick up on time by an array of potential factors,
including, perhaps, a desire not to inconvenience the day care staff,
or even a lack of information about what the consequences might
be.195 When the consequences were spelled out as a monetary penal-
ty, the study suggested, some parents changed their perspective,
reconceptualizing the fine as a price that they were willing to pay
for a late pickup.196
186. Id.
187. Id. at 85.
188. Id. at 86.
189. Id. at 87.
190. See id. at 86-87.
191. See id.
192. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000). 
193. See Emanuela Carbonara et al., Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox, 9
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 837, 838 (2008) (claiming that Gneezy and Rustichini’s results were
“surprisingly different” from typical cost-benefit analysis). 
194. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 192, at 3.
195. See id. at 10.
196. See id. at 14.
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Recasting these findings through the lens of SVO, one could
imagine the parents, pre-fine, in a prosocial orientation.197 Although
the absence of a price does not purely implicate a cooperative-
prosocial SVO, it does implicitly encourage parents to weigh the
costs and benefits to both parties when they pick up their children
and to act in a way that considers the resources that their behavior
will consume on the part of the other party when they are late.198
Parents pay others to watch their children, acknowledging that
time without the children provides some benefit, whether it be in
order to work outside the home or engage in other pursuits.199 The
time that day care workers spend with the children is compensated,
acknowledging that the time spent with the children in that setting
is a burden offset by the payment for services.200 In this situation,
then, the allocation of resources to be divided might be free time
without children, and prosocial parents want the time to be dis-
tributed equally, or at least so that it matches the payment given to
offset the burden. If I impose my children on you during your
ostensibly free time, then I am taking the lion’s share of the benefit
by having child-free time at your expense; if I pick up on time, I am
(theoretically) dividing the benefits and burdens equally. Thus, a
prosocial SVO would provide motivation to pick up one’s children on
time so as to produce an equivalent division. One could argue, then,
that the imposition of the fine activated an individualist SVO and
diminished a prosocial SVO for parents, who were induced to weigh
the value of their own time against the value of their own money
and to choose the option that maximized their own utility rather
than placing the other party’s needs in the equation.201
This growing body of empirical contract law research suggests
that the framing of contracts matters—that casting contractual
behavior in different legal terms can make a difference in how
individuals behave under the contract. Language highlighting the
nature of contract as a set of economic incentives and deterrents
197. See id. at 13-14.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Conversely, one could also argue that the fine allowed prosocial individuals to
maintain their prosocial outlook on dividing these resources, because the price imposed
suggested that the benefit and burden were being divided equally.
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encourages behavior that relies on economic self-interest—it helps
to promote an individualist SVO as a general norm and as the
appropriate norm for specific contract-related behavior.202 Language
that either does not make this conceptualization salient or that
specifically substitutes a different premise, such as moral obligation
discussed above, encourages behavior that includes adherence to the
contract even in the face of less personal gain. Presumably, con-
tinued adherence to the contract promotes the gain of the other
party, yielding more equivalent economic outcomes and more joint
gain.203
Looking at contractual behavior through the lens of SVO yields
several insights. First, understanding the distribution of individuals
between different SVOs suggests at least one way of understanding
the lack of correspondence between what law and economics schol-
ars predict and what the doctrine actually looks like.204 When
individuals differ in their SVO, they will form markedly different
understandings of what the appropriate outcome in a contract
dispute (often a real world social dilemma) should be. When indi-
viduals who differ in SVO are distributed across the population,
including among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, it is not sur-
prising that there is a lack of consensus as to the correct way to
conceptualize these problems.205
Second, one can see that framing the language of contract—and
of contract law—can change the way that individuals understand
their obligations.206 Looking at legal doctrine, one can see that some
common law approaches expressly encourage an individualistic
SVO, while others encourage a more prosocial SVO. In one particu-
larly counterintuitive case, Market Street Associates Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Frey, Judge Posner wrote an opinion that chastised one party
for using a contract provision that had been overlooked by the other
party in order to gain an advantage for itself.207 In explaining why
202. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
204. See Posner, supra note 170, at 830 (“[T]he economic approach does not explain the
current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming
contract law.”).
205. But see infra Part III.C for a discussion about whether these populations will look like
the general population with respect to SVOs. 
206. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
207. 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (calling the deliberate taking advantage of such
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this failure to point out the oversight did not fall into the category
of excusable failures to disclose, Posner wrote,
Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other
with a natural wariness. Neither expects the other to be par-
ticularly forthcoming, and therefore there is no deception when
one is not. Afterwards the situation is different. The parties are
now in a cooperative relationship the costs of which will be con-
siderably reduced by a measure of trust. So each lowers his
guard a bit, and now silence is more apt to be deceptive.
.... Despite its moralistic overtones [the duty of good faith] is
no more the injection of moral principles into contract law than
the fiduciary concept itself is.208
Posner took pains to adhere to an economic analysis, continuing, 
It would be quixotic as well as presumptuous for judges to
undertake through contract law to raise the ethical standards of
the nation’s business people. The concept of the duty of good
faith like the concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating
the terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen
the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute....
It is true that an essential function of contracts is to allocate
risk, and would be defeated if courts treated the materializing of
a bargained-over, allocated risk as a misfortune the burden of
which is required to be shared between the parties (as it might
be within a family, for example) rather than borne entirely by
the party to whom the risk had been allocated by mutual
agreement.209
However, Posner’s ultimate conclusion spun in a different direction.
After carefully constructing the contracting parties as sophisticated
individual business entities, he went on to suggest that once the
parties were involved in a contract, they could no longer be viewed
solely as individual actors.210 That is, he explained, “[C]ontracts do
oversight “sharp dealing that ... [may] be actionable as fraud or deceit”).
208. Id. at 594-95 (first citing AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035,
1040-41 (7th Cir. 1990); and then citing Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
209. Id. at 595.
210. See id.
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not just allocate risk. They also (or some of them) set in motion a
cooperative enterprise, which may to some extent place one party at
the other’s mercy.”211
This express change in a party’s status from an individual to a
member of a group makes all the difference, Posner thought, in
terms of legal obligation: “The parties to a contract are embarked on
a cooperative venture, and a minimum of cooperativeness in the
event unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage is re-
quired even if not an explicit duty of the contract.”212 Interestingly,
but unsurprisingly, given the facts of the case, Posner did not be-
lieve that a mutually dependent cooperative relationship will alone
yield prosocial behavior.213 Indeed, he wrote, “The office of the
doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior
that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship might enable
in the absence of rule.”214
Posner suggests that a mutually dependent cooperative relation-
ship ought to be governed by different rules than other interac-
tions.215 While we can expect individuals to attempt to maximize
their self-interest to the full extent possible, we can still mandate
that they behave in a prosocial manner through legal rules.216 Just
as we, as a society, are a complex combination of prosocial and
proself SVOs, the case reflects an odd admixture of individualist
and cooperative SVOs.
C. Family Law
Perhaps nowhere is the connection and the tension between the
individual and the collective more prominent than in family law,
which focuses on “the legal regulation of the family and its mem-
bers.”217 Certain doctrines in family law expressly govern the dis-
tribution of economic resources, such as child support or alimony,
but relatedly, and perhaps more interestingly, the proself/prosocial
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting AMPAT/Midwest, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1041).
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 594-95.
216. See, e.g., id.
217. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW xxxv (5th ed.
2013).
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dichotomy is also relevant to a broader debate over the purpose and
trajectory of family law at large.218 I sketch out several observations
regarding SVO in both contexts below.
1. Doctrine
Some legal scholars see no-fault divorce, especially unilateral no-
fault divorce, as a classic expression of self-interest triumphing over
the form of the collective.219 No-fault divorce, which ascended in the
1970s in the United States, allowed a party to a marriage to sue for
marital dissolution without showing, as the fault regime required,
that she was “innocent and injured.”220 On its face, the evolution of
a legal doctrine that allowed for individual interest to dictate the
end of a marriage seems largely to embrace, endorse, and foster a
proself view of the family.221 Without any other “reason” to end a
marriage, an individual can simply decide that, from her perspec-
tive, the marriage is broken, and her own self-interest will control
the outcome.222 This proself outcome may explicitly have negative
consequences for other parties, such as dependent children or a
dependent spouse,223 but the utility-maximizing rational actor, who
determines that this marriage is no longer for her, can satisfy her
needs under this system.224
Simultaneously with the rise of no-fault divorce, courts began to
shift their views on classic resource distribution, such as child
support and alimony.225 Courts and legislatures questioned the
218. See infra Parts II.C.2-3.
219. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage & Family:
Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 136 (2005).
220. See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for
Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 61, 67-
68 (2008); see also Alvaré, supra note 219, at 137-38.
221. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
222. See Alvaré, supra note 219, at 137.
223. See, e.g., Liana C. Sayer, Economic Aspects of Divorce and Relationship Dissolution,
in HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE AND RELATIONSHIP DISSOLUTION 385, 390 (Mark A. Fine & John H.
Harvey eds., 2006) (finding that women and children experience substantial declines in
economic well-being after marriage dissolution).
224. The fact that family law has taken a more individualistic turn in recent years is not
a new observation. See Alvaré, supra note 219, at 136. 
225. See generally Kisthardt, supra note 220, at 67-70 (discussing the reforms in the 1970s
and 1990s on property distribution at divorce).
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assumption that a working spouse ought to continue, on into the
future, to support a nonworking spouse.226 In the form of a social
dilemma, this turn suggested a privileging of the proself model; each
individual ought to seek to maximize his or her own resources.
Alimony, which could be seen as an effort to stamp divorced couples
with a prosocial, quasi-egalitarian outcome, became increasingly
disfavored.227
On the other hand, other doctrines in family law appear to be
more prosocial. Although the legal standard of “best interests of the
child”—what will maximize the utility of the child—might sound
proself initially, because it focuses on the individual needs of the
child, when one considers those interests within the context of the
family, one can see that the effort is more prosocial than it might
appear at first glance.228 Rather than simply looking at what will
promote utility for the individual child, the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, and statutes following this model, state that the best
interest of the child includes a variety of factors, such as “the wishes
of the child’s parent or parents,” the child’s wishes, “the interaction
and interrelationship of the child [with parents, siblings, or others],”
“the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community,” and
finally, “the mental and physical health of all individuals in-
volved.”229
226. Id. at 68.
227. See, e.g., Alimony Reform Act of 2011, ch. 124, 2011 Mass. Acts 574; see also CYNTHIA
LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW 5
(2014). It is hard to classify behavior or norms as purely proself or prosocial without thinking
about the contours of the relevant group. As with a corporation, it depends on who you think
the group is—that is, between whom you are dividing the pie. On the one hand, no-fault di-
vorce appears proself because it allows one party to the marriage to dissolve the marriage. On
the other hand, it appears prosocial because it allows parties to maximize their collective
interests. To some degree, these conflicting views rely on different perceptions of empirical
facts. For example, are parties collectively better when an unhappy spouse may leave the
marriage, even if it results in economic hardship? Do children grow up better with happily
divorced parents or unhappily married parents? How do we measure the outcome when one
party is happy and the other is unhappy to end the marriage? 
228. See Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 8 (2002) (“[M]any
states still follow the traditional rule that a parental agreement concerning custody at divorce
is not enforceable unless the court determines that it serves the child’s best interests.”).
229. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1970).
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In fact, considering the problem of child custody from an entirely
different angle, it becomes clear that the doctrine is actually quite
explicitly prosocial. Imagining time spent with the child as a re-
source, and considering the allocation as between two parents, the
law sometimes consciously acts to encourage prosocial allocations
rather than proself allocations. The trend in custody laws toward
“friendly parent” provisions, which promote a legislative policy to
ensure contact with both parents, demonstrates this prosocial orien-
tation.230 These laws expressly discourage parents from demonstrat-
ing individualist or competitive behavior toward the allocation of
time with the child, and in fact, provide a strategic advantage to
parents who are inclusive of the other parent.231
Looking through the lens of SVO can also help shed light on the
patchwork of legal doctrine on the subject of assisted reproduction.
For example, the varied legal approaches to gestational surrogacy
arrangements reveal differences in SVO perspectives.232 Some states
prohibit the process entirely,233 but other states allow surrogacy as
long as it is uncompensated,234 in essence mandating that anyone
who becomes a surrogate must be driven by at least prosocial, if not
altruistic, motives. In a system that permits surrogacy but does not
allow financial compensation, surrogacy could be understood as an
effort to expand the “pie” of available resources (provide more
children for a greater number of desirous parents) and share those
resources equally with others (sharing fertility with those who are
not able to bear children themselves). A state where financial com-
pensation is not permitted for surrogacy sends a clear message that
personal individual gain should have no place in the decision to act
as a surrogate, thus disfavoring proself motives in that context. In
other states, however, surrogacy may be compensated financially,235
implicitly endorsing a proself perspective: under these states’ laws,
an individual may receive financial benefit for the “use” of a
230. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2016). The following subsections contain “friendly
parent” provisions: 452.375.1(3); 452.375.2(2), (4); and 452.375.4. See also Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 288.
231. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2(4).
232. I am grateful to Anne Dailey for suggesting this area of inquiry.
233. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2017).
234. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4) (2017).
235. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(d)(3) (2005).
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resource that provides the other party with a desired outcome.236
And permitting financial reward for surrogacy may “crowd out”
more prosocial motivations;237 some critics of surrogacy fee arrange-
ments suggest that treating surrogacy as a fee-based market service
not only discourages prosocial behavior but also encourages women
to “sell” their gestational services in a way that raises ethical con-
cerns about exploitation for those with limited earning capacity.238
Similarly, the shift over time in discussions surrounding egg
donors reveals a potential change in conceptualizations of SVO.
Originally, medical professionals regarded egg donation as a gen-
erous act of altruism,239 and that perception acted as a strong im-
pediment to payment. But since at least 1994, the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the American Society for Re-
productive Medicine have recognized that egg donors could ethically
be reasonably compensated for the process.240 However, in 2000, the
groups instituted price recommendations and a price cap on dona-
tion.241 A class of egg donors challenged this price cap in a class
action antitrust lawsuit, and the resulting settlement eliminated
restrictions on price and the mention of a suggested appropriate
price.242 Expressly allowing donors to benefit financially for the
harm they suffer in the form of a complex and potentially dangerous
medical procedure rewards donors with a proself motive. Yet the
236. See id.
237. See infra Part IV.C. 
238. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Paid Surrogacy Is Exploitative, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014,
10:59 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/22/hiring-a-woman-for-her-womb/
paid-surrogacy-is-exploitative [https://perma.cc/HU2N-TLTZ] (“I have no issue with altruistic
surrogacy. It is paid surrogacy that gives me ethical heartburn .... The problem is exploi-
tation.... The problem is that the only motive for being a paid surrogate is poverty.”).
239. See, e.g., Rene Almeling, Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in
Egg and Sperm Donation, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 37, 44 (“[I]n many
of the first egg-donation programs, physicians sought altruistic women from the surrounding
community.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the
Gamete Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 59, 61 (“[D]espite the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, there is a clear societal and industry consensus that
egg donors are—and should be—motivated primarily by altruism and the desire to help the
infertile, rather than by the desire for monetary compensation.”).
240. Kelly Knaub, Egg Donors Get Pay Limits Axed with Antitrust Settlement, LAW360
(Feb. 1, 2016, 7:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/753389/egg-donors-get-pay-limits-
axed-with-antitrust-settlement [https://perma.cc/5MC9-ZF6B].
241. Robert L. Klitzman & Mark V. Sauer, Kamakahi vs ASRM and the Future of Compen-
sation for Human Eggs, 213 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 186, 186 (2015).
242. See Knaub, supra note 240.
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now-defunct price caps reflected a tenuous balance between pro-
social and proself SVOs, allowing payment—but not too much pay-
ment.243
Comparing egg and sperm donation, as has been remarked
elsewhere,244 reveals an interesting distinction: men have long been
paid for sperm donation, a relatively easy and very safe process,
whereas compensating women for egg donation, a much more
invasive and potentially hazardous procedure, has faced much more
scrutiny and criticism.245 Considering this distinction in the face of
SVO reveals an alignment of SVO stereotype to practice: women, in
stereotype more selfless and oriented toward others (prosocial), ver-
sus men, in stereotype more agentic and self-interested (proself).246
Notably, despite the stereotypical congruence in the previous rules
adopted by the medical organizations,247 there is no evidence that
SVO consistently or significantly correlates with gender.248
243. As Kimberly Krawiec explains, “[T]he United States exhibits a distinct unease with
a complete commodification of egg donation, embracing instead an apparent middle ground
possessing elements of both gift and market exchange.” Kimberly D. Krawiec, Markets,
Morals, and Limits in the Exchange of Human Eggs, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 354
(2015). Of course, I do not mean to suggest the entire surrogacy and egg donor doctrine can
be boiled down to a simple analysis of SVO. There are many other important facets to the
debate, including, but in no way limited to, the idea of taboo markets and parental rights
perspectives. 
244. Krawiec, supra note 239, at 62 (“[I]nsistence that sperm donors are motivated pri-
marily by a desire for monetary compensation is so strong that potential donors expressing
altruistic motivations are viewed with suspicion.”). 
245. See id. at 61.
246. See Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution
of Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 736 (1984)
(“Perceivers generally assume that men are oriented toward agentic goals and women toward
communal goals.”).
247. See Krawiec, supra note 239, at 62.
248. See Aukje Nauta et al., Social Value Orientation, Organizational Goal Concerns and
Interdepartmental Problem-Solving Behavior, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 199, 211 (2002)
(finding no correlation between SVO and gender). But see Kerstin Grosch & Holger A. Rau,
Gender Differences in Compliance: The Role of Social Value Orientation 1 (Research Training
Grp. 1666: “GlobalFood”—Transformation of Glob. Agri-Food Sys., Univ. Göttingen, Glob-
alFood Discussion Papers, No. 88, 2016) (finding that gender differences in cheating in a
simple laboratory game could be traced to SVO, specifically to individualist men).
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2. Rights and Theory
Some scholars and jurists suggest that over time, doctrines in
family law have become more individual-based and less coopera-
tively oriented, even beyond the division of purely economic re-
sources.249 Disputes regarding resources such as legal entitlements,
including the right to marry, to be a parent, or to not be a parent, in-
creasingly revolve around divisions between prosocial and proself
orientations.
What is especially interesting about this shift in orientation is
that both conservative and liberal family law scholars alike note the
shift, but these scholars deploy prosocial and proself orientations for
different aims in different contexts. So, for example, one conserva-
tive scholar noted that “alterations to family law include an ex-
pansion of the concept of increasing individuality and a contracting
sense of community,” and explicitly tied this development to legal
doctrine around abortion rights.250 Yet more liberal scholars can
equally decry the proself orientation toward the primacy of the
individual, albeit in other areas of family law. Martha Fineman, for
instance, argues vehemently against what she calls “the myth of
autonomy,” claiming that legal systems should not ignore connected
dependencies between people, as well as the costs of meeting the
needs of dependents.251 Scholars focused on a critique of “the pri-
vatization of dependency”252 argue that the costs of child care and
249. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Roe’s Effects on Family Law, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339,
1341 (2014).
250. Id.
251. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 271 (2004).
252. Explaining the idea of the privatization of dependency, Brenda Cossman writes:
Family law has always involved the public enforcement of private responsi-
bilities of individual family members. But, in an era of privatization and the
emergence of a neo-liberal state, characterized by a reduction in government
social spending and a transfer of these responsibilities to the private sphere, it
might be expected to have a newfound importance. Indeed, in many western
nations, family law has become a more important regulatory instrument for the
enforcement of private support obligations for economically dependent family
members. More specifically, society has called upon family law to address the
economic needs of women and children at precisely the moment when it is
dismantling the welfare state and public financial assistance has become
increasingly scarce.
Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Depen-
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other dependent care ought to be shared broadly in society through
greater government support,253 taking what is arguably a prosocial
stance regarding the division of resources and responsibilities.254
Conversely, typically more conservative voices argue for individual
responsibility in the allocation of resources toward dependent care,
taking a more proself position.255
In another example, Justice Samuel Alito recently described the
evolution of family in terms that invoke the prosocial/proself divide
in his dissent in United States v. Windsor,256 which struck down the
portion of the federal Defense of Marriage Act that restricted mar-
riage to heterosexual couples.257 Rather than dynastic, interfamilial,
economic, or procreative arrangements involving the family, “an
ancient and universal human institution,” current marriage focuses
on a romantic love ideal that has at its core two individuals reaching
out to one another.258 Justice Alito contrasted these two competing
ideas of marriage—one, prosocial, with the pedigree of “human
history and ... many cultures,” is “inextricably linked to procreation
and biological kinship,” while the other, proself, is “consent-based”
and characterized “by strong emotional attachment and sexual at-
traction ... between two persons.”259 Although there are two people
involved in the more recent view of marriage, Justice Alito cast this
as, at heart, a fundamentally individualistic perspective: every
dency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 416-17 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
253. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and
Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 25,
38 [hereinafter Alstott, Neoliberalism]; Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as
Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 28 (2010).
254. The Family and Medical Leave Act, for instance, could be imagined as a prosocial
effort to divide resources and responsibilities more equally between individuals and employers
with regard to family obligations. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012)). Thanks to Susan
Appleton for this useful insight. 
255. See Cossman, supra note 252, at 505-06. One might consider this last position
individualistic, as the goal is merely to make sure that individuals do not suffer a loss through
the actions of others. But some arguments against using shared resources for dependent care
draw on a more competitive strand, suggesting a focus on relative advantage over another
person or group.
256. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 2695 (majority opinion).
258. Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2718.
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person has a right to choose with whom to spend her life, as the
expression of her own individual self-interest.260
This focus on the individual and the rights of the individual in
Windsor—and the unhappiness with such a focus from dissent-
ers—was not new, but rather part of a trend emerging over the last
forty-plus years. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, a 1972 case, the Supreme
Court invalidated a restriction on the right to distribute contracep-
tion to unmarried individuals, noting that a married couple “is not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an as-
sociation of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup.”261 The Court conceptualized the individual’s
right to privacy as critical.262 Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, the
Supreme Court struck down a criminal sodomy statute on the
ground that the law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individ-
ual.”263
One interesting observation that stems from looking at SVO in
family law is that SVO and political or moral ideology do not consis-
tently match up along clear and obvious lines, despite the fact that
research on SVO and political orientation has found a connection
between more prosocial leanings and liberalism, and proself ori-
entation and conservatism.264 In the economic sphere, one might
expect a pro-market conservative to be more proself and imagine
that a liberal who supports government intervention might be more
prosocial, and indeed, these findings are supported in the re-
search.265 Similarly, they track perspectives like Fineman’s, noted
above, in which a left-leaning approach advocates against the
260. See id.
261. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
262. See id.
263. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (discussing the liberty rights of the individual).
264. See Kennon M. Sheldon & Charles P. Nichols, Comparing Democrats and Republicans
on Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 589, 616 (2009) (finding
connection between conservatism and proself orientation among law students in the United
States); Paul A.M. Van Lange et al., Are Conservatives Less Likely to Be Prosocial than
Liberals? From Games to Ideology, Political Preferences and Voting, 26 EUR. J. PERSONALITY
461, 469 (2012) (finding same connection among general population in Italy and the
Netherlands).
265. See Sheldon & Nichols, supra note 264, at 616; Van Lange et al., supra note 264, at
469.
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individual, market-based approach to dependent care.266 Yet in the
family law sphere, we see Justice Alito in Windsor casting a skep-
tical eye on gay marriage by espousing largely prosocial and anti-
proself rhetoric.267
The disagreements among family law scholars on the left and the
right are notable for how both sides at once can decry and praise the
individual perspective, and then, simultaneously but in other con-
texts, do the same with the prosocial perspective. This distinction
may suggest fundamental ideological distinctions in opinions about
whose interest ought to be paramount in what particular sphere. So,
for instance, political liberals might be prosocials in the economic
sphere but proself in the individual, constitutional rights sphere,268
while political conservatives might be proself in the economic arena
but more prosocial with respect to individual, constitutional rights.
Again, as with corporate law, these distinctions also serve to high-
light the importance of the definition of whose interest is defined as
part of the collective and against whom we perceive the interests of
the individual to be pitched. In family law, it is especially notable
that scholars on both sides of the political divide appear to find
prosocial arguments particularly appealing, and to want to cast
their critiques of modern doctrine in prosocial terms, perhaps in an
unconscious desire to tap into the implicit idea that the “family” is
a prosocial, not a proself, entity.
3. Family Law Practice
Interestingly, even as some of the prominent modern devel-
opments of family law appear to be largely driven by proself norms
and to reinforce the norm of proself behavior, one of the most
266. See FINEMAN, supra note 251, at 271.
267. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
268. Indeed, scholars writing about rights in family law characterize “the liberal conception
of humans as able, autonomous adults”—underscoring an individualist perspective—as a
“moral ideal.” See EICHNER, supra note 48, at 3. Here, the liberal strand of thought gives rise
to a proself, not a prosocial, value orientation. See id. Family law scholars push back against
the conception of liberal ideals of autonomy as monolithic. For example, Jennifer Nedelsky
situates the self not within a tradition of individual autonomy, but rather, as the nexus of
relationships in which an individual is involved—the “relational self.” JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND THE LAW 4 (2011). She
adds that “a relational self requires relational conceptions of values, which then require
appropriate forms of law and rights built around those conceptions.” Id. at 5. 
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innovative new developments in the practice of family law involves
“collaborative law,” which is an effort to rethink family law conflict
resolution mechanisms.269 In collaborative law, parties agree to use
a particular set of attorneys and engage in a collaborative process
with a shared team of specialists, such as financial consultants or
other experts, in order to resolve their disputes.270 If this process
and these efforts fail, parties must find new counsel to represent
them in subsequent proceedings.271 One of the critical aspects is that
the attorneys engaged in the collaborative alternative dispute res-
olution process will not be the same attorneys who will litigate the
case; the theory is that this change of counsel will foster collabora-
tive and amicable behavior during the initial process without efforts
to strategically position oneself for the potential ultimate court
resolution.272 
The collaborative law movement, like the increasing trend to-
ward mediation in family disputes (and beyond), represents an
effort to behave cooperatively in order to benefit all of the members
of the dissolving family, and originated as a movement formed
directly against what was perceived as a highly proself, and indeed,
proself-competitive, field of practice in which scorched earth tactics
were often employed.273 The collaborative law movement, along with
the use of mediation in family law, represents a trend in dispute
resolution that explicitly attempts to use legal process to encourage
269. The Uniform Collaborative Law Act has been enacted in fifteen states and Wash-
ington, D.C. See Legislative Enactment Status: Collaborative Law Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act [https://
perma.cc/27FF-NX3K].
270. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(3)-(4) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
271. See id. § 9(a).
272. See, e.g., Mandell v. Mandell, 949 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“[Collaborative
law] is a form of dispute resolution in which the parties retain counsel specially trained in
collaborative law and enter into a contract to negotiate a settlement without involving the
Court or a third party arbitrator. As part of the process the parties may agree to engage
neutral experts to assist them, such as accountants or appraisers. One of the principal fea-
tures of the process is that, if the matter is not resolved, the attorneys who represented the
parties in the unsuccessful effort to collaborate upon a settlement may not represent the
parties in the ensuing litigation. The theory is that pre-litigation posturing is eliminated and
clients have a greater degree of influence in candid negotiations in which the clients parti-
cipate directly.”).
273. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 4 (2001).
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more prosocial disputing. The next Part more specifically ad-
dresses considerations regarding SVO and dispute resolution
processes.
III. SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Legal disputes often arise because of underlying social dilemmas.
Individuals disagree about resource allocation and bring their
disputes to the legal system for resolution. As noted in the Part
above, legal doctrine weighs in on these disputes with rules and
rhetoric that can both reflect and espouse SVOs. Legal disputes, in
turn, are social dilemmas that invoke legal rules and legal process
for resolution. The legal system’s intervention in the resolution of a
social dilemma suggests an important role for perceptions of justice
and fairness, and psychologists have studied how individuals’ SVO
affects perceptions of justice. Psychologists have found that concep-
tions of what justice—as an abstract principle—means to people are
often prosocial.274 For example, notions of equality underpin many
conceptions of justice, and equality is part of a prosocial orienta-
tion.275 The following Part considers the relationship between justice
research and SVO, and its potential implications for legal dispute
resolution.
A. Social Value Orientation, Procedural Justice, and Legitimacy
A robust literature provides support for the importance of
procedural justice in individuals’ perceptions of the fairness, justice,
and legitimacy of the law.276 Enhancing procedural justice is often
considered a natural, largely costless fix for increasing perceptions
of legitimacy and promoting self-regulation.277 Yet, despite the fact
that procedural justice effects are found across populations and in
a variety of settings, individual differences may alter the way that
procedural justice effects occur—that is, individuals may process
274. Cf. supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
275. Cf. supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (finding that people com-
ply with the law if they believe the law is legitimate, more than because of fear of punish-
ment).
277. See id. at 4.
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fairness cues differently or use different factors to evaluate fairness.
In order to attain the benefits associated with perceptions of process
fairness, it is critical to know how individuals make assessments
about fair treatment. SVO is one individual difference that helps
shed light on how procedural justice may best be provided.
In one study, researchers found that, in making procedural justice
judgments, proself individuals are largely indifferent to procedures
by others, while prosocial individuals are more attuned to the pro-
cedures that the other party experiences.278 In one study, research-
ers varied the voice opportunities for both sides in a dispute.279
When individuals were either granted or denied voice in a decision-
making process, only proselfs still found the process procedurally
just when the other party was denied voice.280 That is, both groups
were influenced by their own voice process when the other party had
a voice, but only proselfs continued to rate the process as fair when
the other party was denied voice.281 Prosocials even preferred a no
voice condition in which both parties were denied voice to a con-
dition where only one side received a voice.282
Additionally, other work suggests that procedural justice is im-
portant to both proself and prosocial individuals, and that enhanc-
ing procedural justice across the board may be a perfect response to
the differences in perspective between prosocials and proselfs. A
long-standing critique of procedural justice suggests that it is mere-
ly for individuals who are interested in groups and connectedness.283
278. See van Prooijen et al., supra note 92, at 1254.
279. Id. at 1249.
280. Id. at 1251.
281. Id. at 1254.
282. Id.
283. Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind’s “group engagement” or “group value” model, which has
become a dominant explanation in psychology for the importance of procedural justice, helps
to explain this result. The Thibaut and Walker instrumental model of procedural justice
posited that individuals only cared about process to the extent that it made a difference in
outcome. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 6-9 (1975). In contrast, Tyler and Lind’s model suggested that people derived some
important sense of self-worth and connection from their treatment by authority figures in
their relevant group. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in
Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 140 (1992); Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 230-40 (1988) (discussing the group value model generally). The
dominance of the Tyler and Lind model undermined the rational actor model, but it also made
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However, research indicates that proself individuals actually ex-
perience greater (negative) procedural justice effects when they are
denied voice than do prosocials.284 Additionally, research demon-
strates that procedural justice is a stronger predictor of certain posi-
tive behaviors among proself than among prosocial individuals.285
B. Negotiation Paradigms and Social Value Orientation
SVO offers yet another lens through which to understand dis-
parities in what economic theory predicts vis-à-vis legal settlement
and actual negotiation behavior. As other work notes, scholars often
treat legal negotiation as a “Wild West” of human behavior.286
Individuals are perceived to care only about the bottom line,287 but
prior research demonstrates, in contrast to that vision, that nego-
tiators often care deeply about fairness, both of the outcome288 and
of the process.289 Understanding that individuals have different
motivations with respect to resource allocation can help us broaden
our understanding of what it means to do well in negotiation. When
data suggests that more than half of the population may value
maximizing joint outcomes, as well as equality of outcomes, it
indicates that a one-size-fits-all approach to settlement negotiation
may not be the best way to serve clients.290
The two dominant frames in negotiation theory are, on the one
hand, the positional or competitive model of bargaining291 and, on
the other, so-called “principled,” problem-solving, or collaborative
procedural justice more susceptible to criticism from commentators who suggested, despite
robust research findings, that only some people, those who care about dignity or status within
a group, would find it compelling. 
284. See van Prooijen et al., supra note 90, at 1310.
285. See id. at 1311-12.
286. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 386 (2010).
287. Id. at 399.
288. See, e.g., Werner Güth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 384 (1982). 
289. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Pro-
cedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473,
494 (2008). 
290. However, there may be differences between the SVOs of lawyers and clients, a point
I consider in greater depth below. See infra Part III.C.
291. See, e.g., James J. White, The Pros and Cons of “Getting to YES,” 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
115, 123 (1984) (reviewing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981)).
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negotiation.292 Both models purport to provide a way for individuals
to maximize their own outcome, but the former model clearly relies
on assumptions of a proself SVO, suggesting small concessions,
withholding information, beginning with inflated numbers, and
other tactics designed to ensure the smallest outcome for one’s
adversary along with the highest outcome for oneself.293 In contrast,
principled negotiation asks negotiators to stand in the other party’s
shoes,294 understand all parties’ interests,295 and brainstorm options
for mutual gain.296 This vision of collaborative negotiation does not
expressly require a cooperative SVO; it may be that an individual
uses collaborative, problem-solving tactics purely out of self-interest.
But the demonstrated behavior looks prosocial.
SVO offers a useful way to understand the clash between these
approaches to negotiation. Rather than thinking about them as
competing with one another to be the “best” approach, understand-
ing them through the lens of SVO indicates that one approach may
be the manifestation of proself orientation, and one approach may
be the manifestation of prosocial orientation. Slightly differently,
the positional, competitive model may be the best prescriptive
method for individuals with proself SVO, and the principled,
collaborative model may be better for those with prosocial SVO.
Thinking about the distribution of the population with respect to
SVO offers a new way to examine older research, such as that of
Gerald Williams and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, who found that in
contrast to expectations, most lawyers reported that their negotia-
tions were more collaborative than competitive, and collaborative,
problem-solving negotiators were perceived as more effective than
their positional counterparts.297
292. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN xviii (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754,
758, 840-42 (1984).
293. See Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325,
346-48.
294. FISHER & URY, supra note 292, at 23.
295. Id. at 40-43.
296. Id. at 56-59.
297. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 18-19 (1983); Andrea
Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of
Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 196-97 (2002).
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On the other hand, negotiation is an area in which competition
may play an even larger role than in other arenas, because so often,
real benchmarks do not exist against which to measure outcomes.
Social comparison cues are particularly acute in this (often dyadic)
interaction, in which it may be that the perceived disparity between
the parties’ outcomes is one of the only extant markers of success or
failure. However, as noted above, an understanding of SVO may
provide negotiators with a useful insight: even a negotiator with a
proself SVO may become convinced of the strategic need to care
about the other party’s outcome. Indeed, this may be the most
provocative idea in Getting to Yes: acting collaboratively can be the
best tool to maximize your own interests, and convincing the other
party—even if she is purely self-interested—that she needs to care
about your interests in order to meet her own goals can be a tre-
mendously effective negotiation strategy.298
Past research suggests a positive correlation between collabora-
tive behavior in negotiation and perceptions of procedural justice.299
Additionally, research suggests that a prosocial SVO also fosters
more cooperative, open, and trusting behavior during negotiation,300
hallmarks of a collaborative negotioation style. This suggests that
perhaps prosocial individuals “create” more procedural justice dur-
ing negotiations, while proself individuals “create” less. Interest-
ingly, recent findings relating to voice and procedural justice in
negotiation suggest that individuals use their own behavior and an-
other’s behavior about equally in assessing the relationship between
voice and fair process,301 and that they use the other person’s be-
havior more in assessing the relationship between trust and fair
process.302 But with respect to the impact of courtesy and respect on
assessments of fair process, parties rely more on their own behavior
than on the behavior of the other party.303 However, there is also a
significant correlation between perceptions of one’s own behavior
298. See FISHER & URY, supra note 292, at 59.
299. See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 289, at 490.
300. Carsten K.W. de Dreu & Paul A.M. Van Lange, The Impact of Social Value Orien-
tations on Negotiator Cognition and Behavior, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1178,
1187 (1995).
301. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Formation of Procedural Justice Judgments in Legal
Negotiation, 26 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 19, 35 (2017).
302. Id. at 36.
303. Id.
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and perceptions of the other party’s behavior.304 These findings may
suggest that, if prosocial individuals are largely looking to their own
behavior to assess procedural justice, or using their own behavior to
make assessments about the other party’s behavior, and simulta-
neously are more likely to act in collaborative ways that foster
perceptions of procedural justice, then they are quite possibly more
likely to experience greater procedural justice in the negotiation
setting.
While this might indicate that proself individuals, then, can act
toward others with impunity, this is not the case. That is because
research also suggests that prosocials are more sensitive to equality
of treatment.305 A proself individual would only look to her own
treatment,306 suggesting that a proself individual might lack any
incentive to behave in a fair manner. However, data indicate that a
proself actor will behave fairly in a negotiation setting if she
believes it is in her strategic interest to do so.307 To the extent that
procedural justice effects are useful for gaining adherence to nego-
tiated agreements, and to producing impressions of system legiti-
macy, even proself individuals ought to recognize their strategic
benefits.
C. Lawyers, Clients, and Social Value Orientation
Although there has not been any profession-specific measurement
of SVO, context suggests that lawyers might potentially be more
individualistic or competitive than cooperative.308 In other settings,
some research suggests that lawyers adhere more closely to the
rational actor model than do laypeople.309 The individualistic/com-
petitive frame is dominant in legal structures in the United States.
Law students are acculturated to the practice of law in an adver-
sarial system through the Socratic Method in law school,310 and are
304. Id. at 37.
305. See van Prooijen et al., supra note 92, at 1251.
306. Id. at 1249. 
307. Id. at 1251.
308. See supra Part III.B.
309. See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settle-
ment: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) (finding that lawyers
were less susceptible to cognitive biases in assessing settlement offers than laypeople).
310. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in
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trained to be zealous, partisan advocates for their clients.311
However, as an older Paper Chase law school norm gives way to
changing ways of interaction in the classroom, this acculturation
may have become more attenuated.
In contrast, clients may not be steeped in years of adversarial
training. Although self-selection by those who bring suit may sug-
gest that clients are more likely to be proself than prosocial, some
plaintiffs may find other redress impossible, while defendants, of
course, have little say in whether they are sued. Thus, there may be
a clash in SVO between lawyers and clients,312 similar to the poten-
tial conflict between lawyers and clients with respect to the impor-
tance of apologies313 and the role of procedural justice judgments.314
Differences in perspective between lawyers and clients can be a
source of tension generally.315 Understanding this potential differ-
ence in SVO, and how it may affect lawyers’ and clients’ desired
courses of action,316 may prove useful and important in facilitating
communication between lawyers and their clients. If lawyers are
trained to understand this potential difference in perspective, they
a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 527 (2007). 
311. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 511 (1994) (noting the
professional ideology for lawyers requiring zealous advocacy).
312. But see id. at 510-11 (studying how cooperation and conflict among lawyers in dispute
resolution detriments the lawyers’ clients, for whom the lawyers are acting as agents); see also
Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation?
Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 332 (1997) (testing Gilson and Mnookin’s idea
that client principals may be able to cooperate more often by choosing agent lawyers with
reputations for cooperation). 
313. See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement
Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 396-97 (2008) (researching how and why lawyers
and clients (laypeople) view the implications of apologies for their settlement-related judg-
ments and decisions differently).
314. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 286, at 420-31 (discussing differing procedural
justice considerations among lawyers and clients).
315. Robert Mnookin and his colleagues suggest that this tension between agents and prin-
cipals is one of the central issues in legal negotiation, along with the tension between creating
and claiming value and the tension between empathy and assertiveness. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN
ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9-10 (2000). 
316. Lawyers’ perspectives influence their presentation of information to their clients.
“Even where they think of themselves as merely providing information for clients to integrate
into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by myriad judgments, conscious or not,
about what information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style and
phrasing to adopt.” William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case,
50 MD. L. REV. 213, 217 (1991).
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may be better able to understand their clients and be explicit about
their clients’ orientations as well as their own in their thinking,
planning, and advising. Some have argued that one advantage of
lawyers is that they are able to be more “clear-eyed” and rational
than clients.317 To the extent that the lawyer may believe that a
proself orientation is more appropriate than a prosocial orientation
in a given transaction or lawsuit, the terminology of SVO will give
a lawyer a useful way to begin to discuss strategy that may be more
proself in nature. Thinking about this difference as one of SVO
rather than a choice between “rational” and “irrational” behavior
may give lawyers a more appealing way to frame this issue with
their clients. Similarly, it may provide lawyers a greater degree of
comfort to think about taking client-directed actions that may differ
from their own instincts, if they can reconceptualize these actions
not as irrational but rather taken in the service of an SVO different
than their own.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The research on SVO provides a novel and robust lens through
which to think about a host of issues in the law. The above Parts
introduced the idea of SVO in a range of legal contexts, providing
several examples of insights related to SVO in selected doctrinal
and systemic areas. But SVO’s implications in the legal system go
well beyond these domains. Indeed, issues about our individual and
collective burdens and benefits are at the core of the organization of
our society under law. In a speech in Flint, Michigan, then-Presi-
dent Barack Obama discussed his perspective on what led to the
Flint water contamination crisis,318 highlighting SVO in language
that could not have been more explicit unless he had used the term
itself:
[The source of the contamination is] a mindset that says
environmental rules designed to keep your water clean or your
317. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 309, at 81-82.
318. See generally Scott Atkinson et al., Anger and Scrutiny Grow over Poisoned Water in
Michigan City, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/us/flint-
water-michigan-attorney-general.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/2BBS-NEES] (discussing the
Flint water contamination crisis).
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air clean are optional or not that important or unnecessarily
burden businesses or taxpayers. It’s an ideology that underval-
ues the common good, says we’re all on our own, and what’s in
it for me, and how do I do well, but I’m not going to invest in
what we need as a community. And as a consequence, you end
up seeing an underinvestment in the things that we all share
that make us safe, that make us whole, that give us the ability
to pursue our own individual dreams. So we underinvest in pipes
underground. We underinvest in bridges that we drive on and
the roads that connect us and the schools that move us for-
ward....
....
And that attitude ignores how this country was built, our
entire history, which is based on the idea that we’re all con-
nected and that what happens in a community like Flint matters
[to] everybody and that there are things that we can only do
together, as a nation, as a people, as a State, as a city, that no
man is an island.319
Choices about resource allocation govern the way that legislatures
behave when they act to divide social goods directly, such as when
budgets include benefits to certain groups, whether that group
comprises those that drink tap water or those that take a certain
bridge on their route to work. So too, tax laws allocate benefits and
burdens among and between different people.
But laws distribute social goods that are beyond directly financial
or even indirectly financial resources, including rights and privi-
leges. SVO often undergirds the rhetoric that advocates and critics
alike use to argue for and against political choices and allocations
of rights and resources. President Donald Trump famously em-
braced a competitive SVO during his campaign, repeatedly stressing
his plan to “have so much winning if I get elected that you may get
bored with winning,” and conceptualizing both foreign and domestic
policy matters in terms of winners and losers.320 Similarly, Senator
Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, recently expressed
319. Remarks in Flint, MI, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3-4 (May 4, 2016).
320. Ian Schwartz, Trump: “We Will Have So Much Winning if I Get Elected that You May
Get Bored with Winning,” REALCLEAR POL. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
video/2015/09/09/trump_we_will_have_so_much_winning_if_i_get_elected_that_you_may_
get_bored_with_winning.html [https://perma.cc/U9VU-S5NB].
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his view on political activity after an election in, notably, competi-
tive terms: “[W]inners make policy and losers go home.”321
Contemplating SVO in the political landscape suggests a po-
tential role for SVO in better understanding the rise of neoliberal-
ism. In the last decade, legal scholars have begun to explore the
intersection of legal doctrine with neoliberalism—the notion that
“the measures and values of the market are used to index the
success of the state and its citizens,”322 and that “[t]he market-model
of choice and efficiency is extended to the level of the individual.”323
Neoliberalism is built on an individualist SVO—it focuses on the
aggregate behavior of individuals acting in their own self-interest.324
Backlash against neoliberal legal and political choices has come, in
recent years, from both prosocial and proself-competitive angles. For
example, opposition to free trade treaties and lower tariffs helped
propel President Trump’s protectionist, proself-competitive policies
to victory;325 in contrast, the debate over the Affordable Care Act
was largely between individualists embracing a market approach
and prosocials advocating an equal split of health care resources.326
SVO helps understand the role of neoliberalism in other areas of
the law, as well. For instance, Deborah Dinner recently considered
the potentially symbiotic, rather than oppositional, relationship
between neoliberalism and Title VII.327 While a traditional per-
spective might see antidiscrimination law and free market ideals as
fundamentally at odds, Dinner draws out the connection between
them by noting how antistereotyping and efficiency are core under-
pinnings of support for Title VII.328 Both of these values can be
321. Rebecca Savransky, McConnell: ‘Winners Make Policy, Losers Go Home,’ HILL (Feb.
21, 2017, 3:18 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/320506-mcconnell-winners-make-
policy-and-losers-go-home [https://perma.cc/SD45-FN22].
322. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 71, 72.
323. Id. at 73.
324. Id. at 87.
325. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump’s Protectionist Economic Plan Is Nothing
New, ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/trumps-
protectionist-economic-plan-is-nothing-new/512585/ [https://perma.cc/2HFN-FKLK].
326. See Repeal Obamacare, INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.
intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/repeal-obamacare [https://perma.cc/9PAS-JA5R].
327. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment Discrimination Law in the
Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059, 1064 (2017).
328. See id. at 1064-65.
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traced back to, in some large part, concerns over the rights of indi-
viduals, rather than the needs of a collective. As Dinner explains,
neoliberalism and Title VII share a view “that the fundamental
subject of law is the individual rather than the collective.”329
Thinking about Title VII, or other legal doctrine, from a SVO per-
spective could prove fruitful in better understanding the connection
between free market perspectives and doctrinal individualism.330
A. Social Value Orientation as a Lens to Understand Doctrine
Thinking about the multifaceted ways in which laws are tools of
resource allocation—both narrowly and broadly defined—helps
demonstrate the broad power of the SVO paradigm. One key
takeaway from my analysis here is simply that SVO provides an
important lens through which to view our legal system—one with
the potential to provide insights that are just as significant as the
central idea from law and economics that laws are crafted to
optimize a cost-benefit analysis.331 While law and economics has
been a transformational lens through which to look at legal doc-
trine, process, and theory over the last several decades, SVO is also
a transformational lens that provides more depth and nuance with
respect to the realities of human behavior.
A related conclusion is that using the SVO lens reveals more
readily the considerations that play into some doctrinal decisions.
In particular, once one taps into the SVO framework, it becomes
easy to see how judges and scholars may be grappling with an effort
to balance and appropriately weigh different orientations. In some
circumstances, existing legal frameworks may privilege one ori-
entation over another, but often, these frameworks seem to try to
balance between them, struggling, for example, to protect prosocial
interests in a more stereotypically proself-seeming setting like
contract or business law,332 but protecting proself interests in a more
329. Id. at 1062.
330. For other works that consider the connection between neoliberalism and legal
doctrine, see, for example, Alstott, Neoliberalism, supra note 253 (examining the connections
between neoliberalism and family law); and Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Levi-
athan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 131 (exploring the connection between
intellectual property law and neoliberalism).
331. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 30.
332. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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obviously communal setting like family law.333 This constant bal-
ancing approach reflects, most likely, our inherent discomfort with
completely proself or completely prosocial orientations. SVO is not
a one-size-fits-all paradigm, and the mixed nature of prosocial and
proself strands in the law illustrates that tension.
B. Social Value Orientation as a Challenge to the Utility 
Assumptions of Law and Economics
Another important insight is that SVO research poses a threat to
the descriptive, predictive claims of the rational actor model. Simply
put, we are not all—or even mostly—rational actors in the sense of
wishing our economic utility to be maximized across all settings.334
In yet another way, this strand of research provides further evi-
dence that real human psychology does not match the rational actor,
and offers additional support for the idea that economics must take
into account actual human behavior in considering implications in
the legal context.335
This is a more important point than may initially be apparent. It
is not just that law and economics’ rational actor model is not a good
positive descriptor. From Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”336 onwards,
the basic economics framework to maximize collective utility has
been understood to be to maximize individual utility and then
aggregate.337 Each individual, acting in the service of his or her own
individual utility, should collectively maximize societal utility.338
Indeed, one might imagine that the prosocials in the simple allo-
cation games are making, to be blunt, the wrong choice.339 Indeed,
the question might then be: How can we get these misguided souls
to change their minds and act rationally? But that question assumes
the rightness of its own framework built around the importance of
333. See supra Part II.C.
334. See supra Part I.C.
335. See Thaler, supra note 94, at 1577-79.
336. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
242 (J. Maynard 1811) (1776) (“[B]y directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”).
337. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 977.
338. See id.
339. My thanks to Kathryn Spier for this insight.
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individual utility. When utility is deeply bound up with relational
concerns, the notion of individual maximization loses some concep-
tual force and appeal.
For example, if an individual’s utility is greater in a 480 points for
self–480 points for other split than in a 540 points for self–280
points for other split,340 then the utility of the 480 points is greater
than the utility of the 540 points, a nonintuitive outcome. The econ-
omist might insist that even though they are cast in the research as
“points,” these numbers must represent dollars or another incom-
plete utility measurement, rather than “utils,”341 because choosing
the lower number clearly indicates that there is hidden utility in the
choice of fewer points. But if roughly half the population regularly
derives meaningful utility from the even split of resources, even at
a loss to self, and potentially even when the total pie is smaller,342
this suggests that our understanding of utility ought consistently to
be more capacious. In addition, another significant portion of the
population, competitors, receive utility from besting others, even
when their own economic results may suffer.343 On both sides, then,
a focus on aggregation of individual utility blinds us to the impor-
tance of relational conceptions of utility.
If only roughly one-quarter of all individuals naturally consider
utility as a purely individual matter,344 ignoring the relational ef-
fects of utility misses out on the implications of a vast majority of
human behavior. Although more legal scholars are increasingly
turning to an examination of the explicit importance and role of
relationships in the law,345 a more robust focus on interconnection
and its implications for the law, especially from the law and eco-
nomics community, would only amplify our understanding of the
way the law does, and should, work. Highlighting the importance
340. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
341. Utils are a nonmonetary measurement unit that economists use to capture or
represent utility. See Marc Davis, Microeconomics: Assumptions and Utility, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/microeconomics/microeconomics2.asp?lgl=v-table
[https://perma.cc/V2FQ-R9GK].
342. See De Cremer & Van Lange, supra note 39, at S14. 
343. See Eek & Gärling, supra note 66.
344. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 74.
345. See, e.g., ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011); NEDELSKY, supra note 268; Laura A. Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).
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of SVO in fundamental perceptions about how resources should be
allocated suggests the need for a radical realignment of our current
approach, in which the primacy of the individual and of individual
utility is largely unchallenged. Thinking about individual decision-
making from the perspective of individuals who are focused on
relational outcomes offers a radically different angle from which to
view legal doctrine.
C. Social Value Orientation and the Function of the Law
A third conclusion here stems from the fact that the law both
expresses our ideal of optimal behavior and sends us cues about the
behavior we ought to exhibit.346 That is, law captures our intuition
about what the law ought to be and, at the same time, molds how
we act.347 Because research shows that populations are divided
between prosocial and proself orientation,348 the classic law and
economics paradigm does not provide a positive account of how all
or even most people think about resource allocation questions that
affect what the law should be. Thus, SVO provides a way of con-
ceptualizing many of the choices made by the law—whether they
enshrine a prosocial or a proself vision of ideal behavior. The fact
that individuals are divided in this way helps to surface and crys-
tallize the insight that the law is encapsulating choices—and not
inevitable ones—about these allocations.
The mix of prosocial and proself strands in the law also points to
the complex interplay between the expressive function of the law
and the normative function of the law.349 On the one hand, we may
expect that the law represents a manifestation of the will of the
people, so that it merely reflects what we believe ought to happen
generally speaking, or what most people would believe they should
do, and perhaps only reins in the behavior of a few bad apples at the
346. See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence,
and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000).
347. Id.
348. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 74.
349. The expressive function of the law is to share some norm in a meaningful way as it is
expressed; thus, it too has a normative component in that it intends to both express the norm
and to shape individuals toward adopting that norm. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 166, at
2024-25.
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margins.350 For example, a law forbidding murder represents the
collective view of society; most people, we might imagine, would not
kill others even without an express penalty for doing so, but some
people would, and so the law expresses the general sentiment while
acting as a potential deterrent to some minority. On the other hand,
we might imagine that the law represents a normative vision of how
human passions and desires ought to be channeled, against their
natural inclinations. For instance, if we imagine that most people
would, left to their own choice, steal from others, then a law that
outlaws theft runs counter to their nature but attempts to shape
and encourage different behavior.351
Translating this difference to the SVO context, there may be
places where the expression of a particular SVO through law is a
reflection of our perceptions that most individuals share that
orientation, but in other places, the expression of an SVO through
statute or doctrine may indicate a desire to change perceived
“natural” inclinations—to tell individuals to act against their base-
line desires. The difficulty of untangling which situation falls in
which camp is further complicated by the fact that, as we know from
SVO research, individuals are divided into prosocial and proself
camps.352 Thus, the same law may express the inclinations of some
while attempting to shape the inclinations of others.
Although it is intuitively appealing that the law might encapsu-
late our previously held perspective on the allocation of resources,
such congruence is not without its own potential costs. In particular,
a law that attempts to mandate or encourage prosocial behavior
350. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously expounded the idea of the law as essentially a set
of predictions about what courts will do—a set of predictions most important from the
perspective of “the bad man.” O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897). Interestingly, Holmes’s “bad man” was motivated by a proself individualist SVO: he
was conceptualized as one who would not otherwise comply with a moral mandate, caring only
for the material consequences to himself. Id. at 459. The bad man thus follows the law only
in order to avoid material deprivation; Holmes suggested that the law is primarily designed
to rein in the vices of the malfeasant through a change in costs versus benefits, casting the
“bad man” as a rational actor unbound, seeking to maximize his utility without a sense of
morals or other values to constrain his behavior. See id.
351. While invoking or activating a SVO can be very powerful, it is not the only driver of
compliance with a law. Other factors and motivations, including deterrence and perceptions
of procedural justice and legitimacy of the legal system, play an important role. See TYLER,
supra note 276, at 91-93.
352. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 74.
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through a set of controls, such as costs and benefits, may, in fact,
end by perversely discouraging a prosocial SVO.353 This might
happen due to “crowding out,” a phenomenon whereby the external
incentives and burdens of law provide extrinsic motivation for
behavior that can supplant more values-based choices based on
intrinsic motivation.354 Scholars have critiqued legal rules on the
ground that when we provide incentives or burdens in a specific
context, those incentives and burdens may provide extrinsic
motivation for behavior that “crowds out” intrinsic motivation for
that same behavior.355 When individuals would not otherwise obey
a law, extrinsic motivation can provide them with a reason to do so,
but when individuals would typically engage in the desired behav-
ior, or refrain from the undesired behavior, research suggests that
the extrinsic motivation can negatively affect intrinsic motivation.356
For example, in the study involving day care discussed above,
substituting a simple fine for intrinsic concerns about inconven-
iencing day care providers and appearing to be a bad person who
takes advantage of others apparently encouraged parents to delay
in picking their children up.357 The fine (an extrinsic motivation)
was not as powerful as the moral or social motivation (intrinsic
motivation) in securing compliance with pickup times.358 Thus a
“law” that imposes costs, even if it has a prosocial motivation (say,
picking up children on time from daycare, or recycling, or paying
taxes), may induce people to perceive even a prosocially motivated
law through proself eyes.359 On the other hand, a law that is largely
prosocial in nature may, instead, activate intrinsic motivations.360
353. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 192, at 3.
354. For a longer discussion of the complex interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vation, see Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 11; see also Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan,
The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 39 (1980); Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2011); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The
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Intrinsic motivations can provide a powerful basis for self-regulation
in accordance with the law, whereas extrinsic motivations rely on
legal enforcement—a command and control system that can be
costly in its monitoring and enforcement.361
In contrast, in other situations, in which individuals may be
inclined to approach a problem with an underlying prosocial SVO,
but the law mandates or suggests a proself SVO, such law may pro-
vide extrinsic motivation that could “crowd out” prosocial orienta-
tions. For example, in the famous case of Ford Motor Company’s
poorly designed Pinto, which exploded when hit from behind be-
cause of the location of the car’s gas tank,362 tort law served to
undermine intrinsic motivation.363 Ford conducted a cost-benefit
analysis and determined that it was cheaper to pay for the future
harm caused (including death) than to move the location of that
tank.364 Ford did not seriously consider the noncompensable harm
to those injured or killed in future accidents in order to weigh the
results for each side in this “allocation of resources” problem.365
Another way to consider this decision, from the SVO perspective, is
that tort law invoked a proself-individualist perspective, activating
for Ford a focus on its own individual outcome. If legal doctrine did
not explicitly suggest a cost-benefit analysis, perhaps managers at
Ford might have been inclined to take a prosocial perspective and 
to choose a course of action driven by corporate social responsibility
for the shared welfare of both customers and company.
The diversity of the population itself on SVO grounds means,
ultimately, that congruence and incongruence between SVOs en-
shrined in legal doctrine and the natural SVOs of the people subject
to the doctrine are both inevitable. And congruence and incongru-
ence alike may produce both reinforcing and undermining effects,
as demonstrated above. The multiple permutations of possible
361. See TYLER, supra note 276, at 4.
362. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 11, at 53.
363. Id. at 61-62.
364. Ford employees wrote an internal memo noting that the eleven dollar gas cap filter
they could install on the Pinto model cars would cost more than damages Ford would expect
to pay for potential human injury and loss of life stemming from the lack of the filter.
Memorandum from E.S. Grush & C.S. Saunby, Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel
Leakage and Fires, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/files/FordMemo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4X7M-D3BR].
365. See id.
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effects discussed above make clear that there is no simple, one-size-
fits-all takeaway for how SVO in the law can both express and
shape SVO among individuals. But a closer analysis of SVO congru-
ence and incongruence, and of the likely interaction between effects
of a particular law’s SVO underpinnings and human behavior, can
only add to the broader debate about the role and meaning of law,366
and benefit the ultimate effectiveness of legal regulation.
D. Social Value Orientation Unmasks Choices
Finally, the fact that SVO is so clearly influenced by cues
demonstrates how important it is to send signals deliberately, and
not accidentally, regarding the behavior that we want to encourage.
Changing individuals’ perspectives about the right choice to make
in a given situation is a powerful way to encourage compliance with
the law, and understanding the role that SVO plays in signaling
appropriate behavior is an important potential tool to do so. When
we want to stimulate prosocial or proself behavior, we are probably
likely to be able to do so in no small number of cases, putting the
prosocial or proself behavior choice squarely in the sights of the
“nudge” movement, which seeks to use small interventions to
change individual behavior.367 Most “nudges” seek to change indi-
vidual behavior in order to overcome cognitive biases; for example,
the status quo bias leads individuals to choose default options in
their retirement savings plans, suggesting that default options
should be carefully crafted to ensure optimal savings.368
While the “nudge” literature explores the idea that law can
mitigate the effects of cognitive biases, casting a broader “nudge”
net that encompasses SVO suggests another area of potential inter-
vention for legal and social nudges—to invoke proself or prosocial
behavior. However, with a population split between natural
inclination toward prosocial and proself tendencies, the decisions
regarding what normative direction in which to “nudge” those who
might change their behavior based on the intervention may be hotly
366. See Cooter, supra note 346, at 5-6.
367. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 4. 
368. Id. at 9-11.
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contested. Given our highly polarized national political conversa-
tion, disputes over the direction of SVO nudges are quite likely.
In contrast to the interventions that make an effort to overcome
cognitive biases, like a change in the default term in a retirement
plan, the interventions on an SVO dimension are more likely to be
controversial.369 But the divide in the population between prosocial
and proself individuals helps to unmask the fact that a proself legal
doctrine (a “rational actor” based doctrine) is not an inevitable
representation of how people do and should act.370 Instead, because
a proself legal rule may potentially shape and change the behavior
of approximately half of the population, understanding SVO helps
to demonstrate that such doctrine represents a normative decision
by courts or other legal actors.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the research on individuals’ measured SVO
preferences, and those preferences’ susceptibility and malleability
in the face of social cues, suggests that the law has options when it
comes to what behavior we seek to invoke and that SVO may
fluctuate in a dynamic, multifaceted environment. More than any-
thing else, SVO research challenges the inevitability of doctrine and
commentary that treat efficiency as a shared, obvious, and inexora-
ble goal. Indeed, SVO research reveals, in part, that our insistent
drumbeat of individual utility—in scholarship, legal doctrine, and
even in law teaching—may provide cues that invoke that very
notion, encouraging a proself orientation, especially among lawyers
and litigants, which may undermine some people’s natural orien-
tation toward prosocial resource allocation. SVO research suggests
that frameworks for resource allocation can differ, and that there is
no reason to assume that a proself, individualist approach is
positively accurate or normatively desirable. SVO helps to more
clearly surface the idea that efficiency and individual utility are
choices—choices that not everyone is naturally inclined to make.
369. Even these relatively straightforward interventions have come under some criticism
as potentially unethical “libertarian paternalism.” See, e.g., MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPU-
LATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 81-82 (2013).
370. See Au & Kwong, supra note 21, at 74.
